On the Meaning of Connectives (Apropos of a Non-Necessitarianist Challenge)

Abstract

Abstract. According to logical non-necessitarianism, every inference may fail in some situation. In his defense of logical monism, Graham Priest has put forward an argument against non-necessitarianism based on the meaning of connectives. According to him, as long as the meanings of connectives are fixed, some inferences have to hold in all situations. Hence, in order to accept the non-necessitarianist thesis one would have to dispose arbitrarily of those meanings. I want to show here that non-necessitarianism can stand, without disposing arbitrarily of the meanings of connectives, based on a minimalist view on the meanings of connectives.Mathematics Subject Classification (2010). Primary 03A05.

The logical bases of contradictory Christology: comments on The Contradictory Christ, Ch. 2

“…12 (Note that classical logic is full of (non-implicative) organic validities: ∼ (p∧ ∼ p), q∨ ∼ q, and so on.) Moreover, the organic parts in those truths are insubstantial: these 12 Sketch of the proof. Suppose that there is a non-implicative organic schema S in FDE → ϕ .…”