Local Elections and the Politics of Small-Scale Democracy

Oliver, J. Eric; Ha, Shang E.; Callen, Zachary

doi:10.1515/9781400842544

Cited by 31 publications

(44 citation statements)

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“…In particular, we expect that smaller districts allow for stronger, more personal connections between representatives and their constituents (Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012;Rogowski 1987, 204). These relationships of trust may also be nurtured by patronage sufficient to sway a portion of the electorate.…”

Section: Impersonality Of the Representative/constituent Relationshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-level Analysis of Electoral Contestation

et al. 2015

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A ccording to the classical perspective, polity size and democracy are inversely related. In this article, we argue that there is an important exception that manifests itself at the district level in settings where multiparty competition is allowed. Specifically, we find that larger districts encourage greater contestation. This results from a little-noticed mechanical effect as well as from several features of constituencies that are affected by size and have direct repercussions for contestation. To demonstrate this thesis we assembled a unique dataset, the Multi-level Election Archive (MLEA), which unites electoral contests across a variety of districts (national, regional, and local) and elective offices from the eighteenth century to the present, including a total of 88 countries, 2,344 elections, 79,658 districts, and more than 400,000 contests. With this evidence we were able to conduct a broad array of statistical tests, some global and others focused on particular countries or election types, all of which support our general argument. E lectoral contestation may be defined as the degree of election-based competition in a political unit. Where contestation is minimal there is little organized opposition, and the incumbent party captures most of the votes and seats. Where contestation flourishes there are more competitors than available seats, a tight race for votes and seats, and frequent turnover in control. Contestation implies ex ante electoral uncertainty. 1 So understood, contestation is integral to the electoral (aka elite, minimal, procedural, or realist) conception of democracy, in which democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups vying for the electorate's approval during periodic elections (

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Section: Impersonality Of the Representative/constituent Relationshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-level Analysis of Electoral Contestation

et al. 2015

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“…The tendency towards personal instead of ideological or programmatic forms of contestation in smaller communities has also been observed in quantitative studies, especially those focusing on local government (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Oliver et al 2012; Oppenheimer 1996). In their impressive study of the characteristics of local government in the US, J. Eric Oliver and his coauthors (2012: ch.…”

Section: Informality and Personalized Politics In Small Statesmentioning

confidence: 76%

When Things Get Personal: How Informal and Personalized Politics Produce Regime Stability in Small States

Veenendaal

2018

Gov. & oppos.

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The personalization of politics, the decline of political parties and the weakening of political institutions in large democracies are considered to produce instability and to undermine democratic governance. Yet despite having extremely informal and personalized systems with non-ideological parties, small states around the world maintain significantly higher levels of democracy and regime stability than large ones. This article addresses this paradox by offering a systematic literature review of 167 case study publications on personalization and informal politics in 46 small states. The analysis reveals that personalized relations between political elites translate into either fragmentation or power concentration, while pervasive patron–client linkages structure the interaction between citizens and politicians. Despite the obvious downsides of these dynamics for democratic governance, the small state system is functional in the sense that it fulfils the needs of both citizens and politicians, which explains why small states have succeeded in maintaining their political stability.

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“…The first, by Maestas (2003), labels officials as ambitious if they plan to run for higher office or stay in office for three or more terms. Another consideration is the size of respondents’ city because Oliver et al (2012) argue that officials from larger cities (pop. around 100,000 or higher) are more ambitious.…”

Section: Robustness Checks and Second Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This suggests that conditional theories (e.g., Fleck, 1999; Hirano et al, 2009) might provide a better explanation of why some policymakers believe targeting core voters is more electorally advantageous. Third, the finding that high turnout voters are rewarded for their participation (see also Martin, 2003) has potentially negative implications for representation at the local level, given the skew in who participates in local elections (Anzia, 2013; although see Oliver et al, 2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

Which Citizens Do Elected Officials Target With Distributive Spending? A Survey Experiment on U.S. Municipal Officials

Dynes

2020

American Politics Research

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Research is mixed as to whether politicians target swing voters or core supporters with distributive spending and whether citizens’ turnout affects this strategy. I use a novel data set and research design to examine this—a survey experiment on elected municipal officials. Respondents indicated which of two neighborhoods to target with a local project. I find that local officials, on average, target swing neighborhoods over core ones because they believe that swing voters are more likely than core voters to electorally punish politicians for targeting other groups. Yet, a large proportion still target core voters but not for reasons consistent with extant theory. Officials generally target high turnout neighborhoods over low turnout ones but under certain conditions are also willing to target lower turnout citizens. These findings point to the need for ongoing work to identify the conditions under which officials will target core or swing voters.

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Local Elections and the Politics of Small-Scale Democracy

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-level Analysis of Electoral Contestation

Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-level Analysis of Electoral Contestation

When Things Get Personal: How Informal and Personalized Politics Produce Regime Stability in Small States

Which Citizens Do Elected Officials Target With Distributive Spending? A Survey Experiment on U.S. Municipal Officials

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