Liability for Pure Financial Loss in Europe: An Economic Restatement

Bussani, Mauro; Palmer, Vernon Valentine; Parisi, Francesco

doi:10.2307/3649142

Cited by 19 publications

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“…Parisi (2003) notices that if the third party gain is higher than the victim's loss, then negative liability should apply: the injurer should be able to collect from the gainer. See Bussani, Palmer and Parisi (2003) for a recent comparative law and economics analysis. 82 Dari-Mattiacci (2004).…”

Section: Tort: Liability For Nonfeasancementioning

confidence: 99%

Negative Liability

Dari‐Mattiacci¹

2009

The Journal of Legal Studies

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Negative and positive externalities pose symmetrical problems to social welfare. The law internalizes negative externalities by providing general tort liability rules. According to such rules, those who cause harm to others should pay compensation. In theory, in the presence of positive externalities, negative liability should apply: those who produce benefits should be paid a compensatory award by the gainers. Nevertheless, the legal system does not display such general negative-liability rules. Rather, it tackles the problem of internalizing positive externalities by implementing a set of different and often indirect solutions. My explanation for this asymmetry in legal remedies rests on three features of a negative-liability regime, relating to intent, incentives, and evidence. These features explain the scope and design of restitution rules, liability for nonfeasance, and other mechanisms for the internalization of positive externalities. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

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Section: Tort: Liability For Nonfeasancementioning

confidence: 99%

Negative Liability

Dari‐Mattiacci¹

2009

The Journal of Legal Studies

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“…But their efforts have often led to the conclusion that most jurisdictions' current application of the pure economic loss rule is eventually the result of mere historical accidents. 5 Following the more extensive study by Bussani, Palmer and Parisi (2003), this article revisits the apparent contradictions brought to light by comparative legal scholars through the lens of economic analysis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The comparative law and economics of pure economic loss

Parisi

Palmer

Bussani

2007

International Review of Law and Economics

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Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal economic loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss. Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although not formally adopting the economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light of efficiency considerations. The comparative analysis reveals that the substantive applications of the economic loss rule in European jurisdictions are consistent with the predicates of economic analysis.

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“…This observation distinguished private losses from social losses and served as one of the explanations for the pure economic loss rule. Later economic assessments of the problem of pure economic loss are increasingly complex (Bussani, Palmer, and Parisi 2003;Dari-Mattiacci 2003). All the analyses assume that the goal of tort law is to maximize social utility and the obligation to pay damages incentivizes utility-maximizing actors to incur precaution costs, a view which is not without its critics (see Sugarman 1985, 564 et seq.…”

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Heuristics and the Problem of Pure Economics Loss

Szczerbowski¹

2018

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The goal of this text is to pose hypotheses related to use of heuristics in the process of deciding cases related to pure economic loss and making laws governing liability for this phenomenon. Pure economic loss is a type of damage where the victim suffers only economically, i.e. there is no bodily harm of damage to property, and there is lack of contractual nexus between the victim and the tortfeasor. Pure economic loss is, in principle, not recoverable in the common law systems and, in principle, recoverable in civil law systems. Pure economic loss is a heterogenic category consisting of a variety of case types, here divided into (1) ricochet loss, (2) transferred loss, (3) loss induced by faulty information. Pure economic loss cases are usually more complex than physical injuries and consequential economic loss, as they may involve a loss of profits. This paper explores the use of heuristics in the process of deciding pure economic loss cases and in process of forming general norms related to them.

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Liability for Pure Financial Loss in Europe: An Economic Restatement

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Negative Liability

Negative Liability

The comparative law and economics of pure economic loss

Heuristics and the Problem of Pure Economics Loss

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