Negative Liability

Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe

doi:10.1086/596197

Cited by 34 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(37 reference statements)

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“…This issue is discussed e.g. by Dari-Mattiacci [2]. Another discrepancy arises when both parties deviate from their obligations in which case the transfers are based on outcomes in hypothetical states rather than on the parties' actual losses in the given state as compared with the efficient state.…”

Section: On Hypothetical Versus Actual Lossesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability

Lando¹

2017

JITE

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Section: On Hypothetical Versus Actual Lossesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability

Lando¹

2017

JITE

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“…Our analysis further extends this literature by distinguishing benefits arising from the injurer-victim interaction from benefits, including benefits to third parties, that arise from the injurer's activity itself, and by identifying the distinct characteristics of B > H cases versus B < H cases. Another strand in the literature considers benefit-producing interactions, exploring why the law generally does not compensate for benefits (see, e.g., Dari-Mattiacci, 2009;Porat, 2009a). These paper, however, do not consider interactions that generate both a harm and a benefit.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Harm-Benefit Interactions

Bar‐Gill¹,

Porat

2013

American Law and Economics Review

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In the standard tort case, the injurer-victim interaction results in harm to the victim. In this paper, we identify and analyze a distinct category of cases -Harm-Benefit ("HB") cases -in which the injurer-victim interaction, results simultaneously in harm to the victim and benefit to the injurer (or to others). Indeed, in these cases the injurer affirmatively prefers to encounter the victim. In HB cases, which are quite common, standard results about the relative efficiency of different liability rules do not apply. When the benefit to the injurer exceeds the harm to the victim, liability should be imposed, whereas if the harm is larger than the benefit the case for liability becomes much weaker. These conclusions imply, counterintuitively, that it may be more important to impose liability on the non-negligent injurer rather than on the negligent injurer. We study the incentive effects of different liability rules, as well as the restitution rule, in HB cases. Our analysis also sheds new light on the law of takings. And it applies in certain contractual settings. More generally, we take the standard tort model, which focuses on one consequence of the injurer-victim interaction -harm to the victim -and expand it to include other consequences. We focus on benefits, but our framework can also be used to study harms, beyond the harm suffered by the victim.

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“…In "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) and in "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) Coase addressed the governance problem directly. While the transaction cost, contract theory, and tort law implications of what has become known as the Coase Theorem has transformed much of the law and economics literature (see, for example, Calabresi and Melamed 1972;Easterbrook 1981;Becker 1991;Easterbrook and Fischel 1991;Ellickson 1991;Epstein 1995;Fischel 1996;Lemley 2000;Demsetz 2002;Acemoglu and Johnson 2005;Beckmann and Wesseler 2005;Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt 2008;Stevenson and Wolfers 2006;Dari-Mattiacci 2009;Dnes and Lueck 2009), the fundamental problems Coase employed to illustrate his basic points are governance problems. This emphasis on governance has also led to a large literature that has come to be known as the new institutional economics.…”

Section: Coase and The 2009 Nobel Laureatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Enduring Power of Coase

Hoffman

Spitzer²

2011

The Journal of Law and Economics

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By many measures, Ronald Coase has been among the most influential economists of the past 60 years. Why is this so? We suggest that Coase's work has enduring appeal to and insight for social scientists in part because it addresses the biggest and most important social problems: How do we solve governance and coordination problems when limited information, common resource issues, and public good issues produce conflicts among several people at once? Any scholar who works on issues of corporate or common-pool governance, pollution, allocation of seats on legislative committees, regulation of systemic risk in financial markets, provision of military forces, patent thickets, creation of optimal communications networks, regulation of decreasing cost industries, or compensation of corporate officers can see his or her work stemming from several of Coase's original insights. Just as John Nash's work reshaped economic theory, almost every field of economics and political science is shaped by Coasean insights. The authors acknowledge the advice and encouragement of John Ledyard, who encouraged us to pursue this topic, of Mike Levine and Roger Noll, who introduced us to governance issues in graduate school, and of Elinor Ostrom, who was a mentor to Elizabeth Hoffman. Elinor Ostrom passed away recently and will be sorely missed. 1 Aside from Coase, probably only John Nash, Kenneth Arrow, Herbert Simon, and Paul Samuelson may be credited with inspiring next-generation winners. Most of Nash's intellectual descendants won their Nobel Prizes before he did, for reasons independent of the brilliance of Nash's insights.

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Negative Liability

Cited by 34 publications

References 46 publications

Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability

Efficient Compensation: Lessons from Civil Liability

Harm-Benefit Interactions

The Enduring Power of Coase

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