No abstract

Recent experimental research on ultimatum and dictator games has found that first movers in such games tend to offer more to their counterparts than noncooperative game theory would predict. In fact, the modal offer is generally half the pie to be divided, while noncooperative game theory would suggest an offer of the smallest monetary unit. It is often argued that these results suggest a taste for fairness on the part of students participating in these experiments. In this paper we report the results of ultimatum and dictator games experiments designed to explore the underlying reasons for this apparent taste for "fairness." We find that if the right to be the first mover is earned by scoring high on a general knowledge quiz, and that right is reinforced by the instructions as being earned, then first movers behave in a significantly more self-regarding manner. Because our instructional procedures for earning rights can be interpreted as a "demand" treatment, but also to remove ail social influences on choice, we conducted "double blind" dictator experiments, in which individual subject decisions cannot be known by the experimenter or by anyone except the decision maker. The results yielded by far our largest observed number of selfregarding offers --significantly more than obtained in any of our other treatments: or any previously reported in the literature. Our interpretation is that offers in ultimatum and dictator games appear to be determined predominantly by strategic and expectations considerations. Other-regarding behavior is primarily an expectations phenomenon, rather than the result of an autonomous private preference for equity.

Recent experimental research on ultimatum and dictator games has found that first movers in such games tend to offer more to their counterparts than noncooperative game theory would predict. In fact, the modal offer is generally half the pie to be divided, while noncooperative game theory would suggest an offer of the smallest monetary unit. It is often argued that these results suggest a taste for fairness on the part of students participating in these experiments. In this paper we report the results of ultimatum and dictator games experiments designed to explore the underlying reasons for this apparent taste for "fairness." We find that if the right to be the first mover is earned by scoring high on a general knowledge quiz, and that right is reinforced by the instructions as being earned, then first movers behave in a significantly more self-regarding manner. Because our instructional procedures for earning rights can be interpreted as a "demand" treatment, but also to remove ail social influences on choice, we conducted "double blind" dictator experiments, in which individual subject decisions cannot be known by the experimenter or by anyone except the decision maker. The results yielded by far our largest observed number of selfregarding offers --significantly more than obtained in any of our other treatments: or any previously reported in the literature. Our interpretation is that offers in ultimatum and dictator games appear to be determined predominantly by strategic and expectations considerations. Other-regarding behavior is primarily an expectations phenomenon, rather than the result of an autonomous private preference for equity.

No abstract

Herein we report on the effect of neutron irradiation-of up to 0.1 displacements per atom at 360(20)°C or 695(25)°C-on polycrystalline samples o f Ti 3 AlC 2 , Ti 2 AlC, Ti 3 SiC 2 and Ti 2 AlN. X-ray diffraction refinement of the irradiated samples showed irradiation-enhanced dissociation into TiC of the Ti 3 AlC 2 and Ti 3 SiC 2 phases, most prominently in the former. Ti 2 AlN also showed an increase in TiN content, as well as Ti 4 AlN 3 after irradiation. In contrast, Ti 2 AlC was quite stable under these irradiation conditions. Dislocation loops a re seen t o f orm in T i 2 AlC a nd Ti 3 AlC 2 after ir radiation at 360(20)°C. The room temperature electrical r esistivity of al l samples i ncreased by an or der of magnitude after irradiation at 360(20)°C, but onl y by 25% after 695(25)°C, providing e vidence for t he MA X pha ses' dy namic recovery at temperatures as low at 695(25)°C. Based on these preliminary results, it appears that Ti 2 AlC and Ti 3 SiC 2 are the more promising materials for high-temperature nuclear applications.