Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition

Abstract

There is a consensus that Kant's aim in the Groundwork is to clarify, systematize and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents' motivation, protect against self‐deception and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. In this paper, I argue that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant's Groundwork shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self‐deception and without being influenced by misleading theory, is deficient. Critical practical philosophy needs to set right agents about the stringency of some of their duties, and agents need to be made aware that they have certain other duties. I discuss how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of the stringency of the duty to not make false promises and how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of duties to self. I finally discuss how his critical practical philosophy can become popular and achieve the correction of the common perspective. I stress the role of education informed by philosophical theory for this and contrast it with so called ‘popular philosophy’.

Kantian Moral Concern, Love, and Respect

“…So although human beings do not need moral philosophy in order to be capable of acting morally, Kant thinks that moral philosophy can help to restore the common moral standpoint in the face of inclination-based rationalisations. Its function is to "clarify, systematize, and vindicate" (Sticker 2017, 85) the thinking of ordinary moral agents and at times to counteract the influence of rationalisations by reminding human beings about the true content and strictness of their duties (Sticker 2017). This is how Kant's approach to moral philosophy enables criticism not just of bad actions, but also of wrongheaded moral beliefs.…”

Kant, moral overdemandingness and self‐scrutiny

“…The correct moral principle is already present in ordinary reasoning as a "standard of its judging" (IV:403.37). See Sticker (2017) for critical discussion of Kant's claim that his ethics merely aims to systematize and vindicate the common cognition of morality.…”

Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant

“…In the Second Critique, Kant stresses that he does not aim to "introduce a new principle of all morality and, as it were, first invent it" (CPrR 5: 8.fn). See Grenberg (2013) and Sticker (2017a) for discussion of Kant's systematization and vindication of the ordinary conception of morality.…”