Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant

Ackeren, Marcel van; Sticker, Martin

doi:10.1017/s1369415418000225

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 30 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…1515See van Ackeren and Sticker, 2018 for discussion of the relation between McDowell's and Kant's respective views of ‘silencing’.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Human nature, reason and morality

Bakhurst

2021

J Philosophy of Edu

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What role should moral philosophy give to considerations about human nature and the character of human life? And what part should such considerations play in moral education? This paper explores these questions by contrasting the 'new intuitionist' position I defend in 'Practice, sensibility and moral education' (Bakhurst, 2018) with Philippa Foot's neo-Aristotelian naturalism, which holds that natural-historic description of the human life-form can furnish us with norms by reference to which failure to act morally can be understood as a kind of natural defect. Following John McDowell, I question whether a being that is rational, and therefore free, can allow such naturalhistorical description to decide norms of behaviour for it. Indeed, the new intuitionist should question whether naturalhistorical description, as Foot construes it, is even meaningful in the human case. For all that, however, I argue there is one natural-historical fact of momentous importance in understanding the human: that human beings become what they are through Bildung or education in the broadest sense. To develop this point, I turn to an unlikely ally, Immanuel Kant, who offers a robust account of Bildung designed to show how people acquire the Denkungsart (cast of mind) demanded by morality. Kant's view, I argue, presupposes knowledge of the human-as entering into both (i) the theoretical knowledge necessary to characterise the Denkungsart and the manner of its cultivation, and(ii) the practical knowledge involved in exercising it, for to be skilled at moral thinking requires understanding human life in its diversity, complexity and essential contestability. To offer

show abstract

“…1515See van Ackeren and Sticker, 2018 for discussion of the relation between McDowell's and Kant's respective views of ‘silencing’.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Human nature, reason and morality

Bakhurst

2021

J Philosophy of Edu

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Timmermann, by contrast, discusses overdemandingness as the current debate understands it, namely, with regard to beneficence to others and specifically, how much latitude beneficence permits (ibid.sec.4-8). The same is true for Van Ackeren, Sticker (2018b). I think that if we look at the kinds of overdemandingness Kant is concerned about, it becomes apparent that duties to self are more problematic for Kant than beneficence and that they are a more salient venue of critical discussion.…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant, moral overdemandingness and self‐scrutiny

Sticker

2019

Nous

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper contributes to the debate about how the overdemandingness objection applies to Kant's ethics. I first look at the versions of the overdemandingness objections Kant himself levels against other ethicists and ethical principles and I discuss in what sense he acknowledges overdemandingness as a problem. Then I argue that, according to Kant's own standards, introspection about the moral worthiness of one's actions can constitute forms of moral overdemandingness. Self-scrutiny and Kant's well-known claim that we can never be certain that we acted for the right reason jeopardize agents' deserved happiness. Furthermore, selfscrutiny can constitute an activity Kant himself criticizes under the labels of "micrology" and "fantastic virtue". The demandingness of critical self-scrutiny has not yet received due attention in the overdemandingness debate since this debate is focused on duties we have towards others.Many philosophers consider moral overdemandingness a central problem for standard forms of Consequentialism. Recently, Immanuel Kant as well as ethical theories that draw on Kantian insights have also received critical attention in the context of the overdemandingenss debate. In the current paper, I will show, firstly, that we find versions of the objection that ethical theories demand too much already employed by Kant. Secondly, I will show how the overdemandingness objection applies to Kant's conception of imperfect duties to self. The systematic upshot of my paper will be to show how we should expand our understanding of overdemandingness if we want to make Kantian ethics part of the overdemandingness debate. The category of duties to self has so far not received much attention in the context of the overdemandingness debate, since overdemandingness is commonly seen as a problem arising from duties to others, specifically, from affluent agents' duties towards the globally poor. Moreover, many current ethicists are skeptical of the category of duties to self. Yet, these duties are pivotal for Kant and must therefore be part of the debate about the potential overdemandingness of his ethics. 1

show abstract

“…I cannot discuss this here. See instead Sticker and van Ackeren (2018) and Sticker (2019). 26 See also Pogge (2002), Ashford (2011).…”

Section: Treating Persons Not As Mere Things 23mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, if helping others would demand extreme sacrifices on our part, we might not even have an obligation to help (and thus we would not fail to treat them as an end), but I cannot discuss this in more detail here. See instead Pinheiro Walla (2015),Sticker and van Ackeren (2018), van Ackeren and Sticker (2018),Formosa, Sticker (2019) for further discussion of the problem of overdemandingness with regard to imperfect duties in Kant.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Poverty, Exploitation, Mere Things and Mere Means

Sticker

2021

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I argue that, alongside the already well-established prohibition against treating persons as mere means, Kant’s Formula of Humanity requires a prohibition against treating persons as mere things. The former captures ethical violations due to someone’s (perceived) instrumental value, e.g. exploitation, the latter captures cases in which I mistreat others because they have no instrumental value to me. These are cases in which I am indifferent and complacent towards persons in need; forms of mistreatment frequently suffered by the world’s poorest. I explain why we need the category of treating others as mere things and what the prohibition against such treatment entails. Prohibitions against treating as mere means and as mere things are both essential for understanding the specific nature and extent of our duties to the world’s poorest.

show abstract

Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant

Cited by 17 publications

References 30 publications

Human nature, reason and morality

Human nature, reason and morality

Kant, moral overdemandingness and self‐scrutiny

Poverty, Exploitation, Mere Things and Mere Means

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About