Kant, moral overdemandingness and self‐scrutiny

Abstract

This paper contributes to the debate about how the overdemandingness objection applies to Kant's ethics. I first look at the versions of the overdemandingness objections Kant himself levels against other ethicists and ethical principles and I discuss in what sense he acknowledges overdemandingness as a problem. Then I argue that, according to Kant's own standards, introspection about the moral worthiness of one's actions can constitute forms of moral overdemandingness. Self-scrutiny and Kant's well-known claim that we can never be certain that we acted for the right reason jeopardize agents' deserved happiness. Furthermore, selfscrutiny can constitute an activity Kant himself criticizes under the labels of "micrology" and "fantastic virtue". The demandingness of critical self-scrutiny has not yet received due attention in the overdemandingness debate since this debate is focused on duties we have towards others.Many philosophers consider moral overdemandingness a central problem for standard forms of Consequentialism. Recently, Immanuel Kant as well as ethical theories that draw on Kantian insights have also received critical attention in the context of the overdemandingenss debate. In the current paper, I will show, firstly, that we find versions of the objection that ethical theories demand too much already employed by Kant. Secondly, I will show how the overdemandingness objection applies to Kant's conception of imperfect duties to self. The systematic upshot of my paper will be to show how we should expand our understanding of overdemandingness if we want to make Kantian ethics part of the overdemandingness debate. The category of duties to self has so far not received much attention in the context of the overdemandingness debate, since overdemandingness is commonly seen as a problem arising from duties to others, specifically, from affluent agents' duties towards the globally poor. Moreover, many current ethicists are skeptical of the category of duties to self. Yet, these duties are pivotal for Kant and must therefore be part of the debate about the potential overdemandingness of his ethics. 1

Enlightenment as perfection, perfection as enlightenment? Kant on thinking for oneself and perfecting oneself

“…Kant points out that the duty to perfect oneself is an imperfect duty: it remains open how far one should go with the cultivation of which talents and in which proportion the different talents should be cultivated (see Kant, 1996f, 6:392, 445–447 but also see Sticker, 2021a). Of particular interest is also Kant's sense for human limits: Because of that, because of our fragility ( Gebrechlichkeit ), it cannot be our duty to attain perfection ( Ought implies Can !…”

“…2020For different views on the notion of an imperfect duty in Kant, see, e.g., Walla (2015), Timmermann (2018), Biss (2021) and Sticker (2021a). Walla and Timmermann argue that imperfect duties are still stringent ones, according to Kant.…”

Kant and Overdemandingness I: The Demandingness of Imperfect Duties

“…He argues that obligations of an imperfect kind cannot be converted into obligations of a perfect kind, but there is ultimately also more overlap between these types of duties than orthodox Kantianism allows(Hope, 2022).11 However, some Kantians explicitly acknowledge duties of aid concerned with life and death situations in one's vicinity, and argue that these duties do not come under beneficence(Herman, 1984), or suggest that beneficence itself should be divided into rectificatory assistance to victims who have suffered injustice from others, relational duties to those in one's vicinity and humanitarian beneficence to strangers(Herman, 2021, ch.7.3). Kant himself indicates that some supposed matters of beneficence are better understood as falling under duties of justice (V:155.fn., VI:453.1-33, 454.22-8).12 See, for instance,Sticker (2021) for a conception of overdemandingness from Kantian resources specifically devised to assess Kantian imperfect duties to self.13 Sometimes Williams' (1981) one-thought-too-many objection is also considered as an overdemandingness objection.However,Smyth (2018, p. 824) has recently plausibly shown that the objection is different in nature and poses a problem for Kant that is different from overdemandingness.14 This notion of overdemandingness is also defended byChappell (2019), who devises a version of consequentialism based on this, which has recently been criticized bySlater (2020Slater ( , 2024. This view of overdemandingness is denied byCohen (2000) and van Ackeren (2018).15 The standard locus for these types of argument areSinger (1972) andUnger (1996).16 Indeed, some of the features of Kantian ethics that account for its appeal are that it is ends or agency focused, not needs based(Herman, 2021, ch.7), is non-maximizing (see, for instance,Herman, 2007, ch.11;, pp.…”

“…12 12 See, for instance, Sticker (2021) for a conception of overdemandingness from Kantian resources specifically devised to assess Kantian imperfect duties to self. …”

On trying too hard: A Kantian interpretation of misguided moral striving

“…66Sticker (2021) argues that the imperfect duty of self‐knowledge is overdemanding for two reasons: uncertainty about one's moral worth will make even the most virtuous person unable to fully enjoy happiness and self‐scrutiny requires constant vigilance that undermines the pursuit of non‐moral projects. I am much more hopeful than Sticker that limiting scrutiny to morally salient actions and an appeal to judgment can resolve the latter concern.…”