Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look at philosophical conceptions of luck (modal and probabilistic ones) and come to the conclusion that knowledge can be lucky in those senses, too. I also turns out that a probabilistic notion of luck can help us see in what ways a particular piece of knowledge or belief can be lucky or not lucky.

This work compares ASR decoding at different subword levels crossed with alternative keyword search strategies to handle the OOV issue for keyword spotting in the lowresource setting. We show that a morpheme-based subword modeling approach is effective in recovering OOV keywords within a Turkish low-resource keyword spotting task, where mixed word and morpheme decoding approach outperforms the traditional subword-based search from word-decoded lattices that are broken down to subword lattices. Furthermore, unsupervised learning of morphology works almost as well as a rule-based system designed for the language despite the low-resource condition. A staged keyword search strategy benefits from both methods of morphological analysis.

International audienceLike many other processes in language comprehension, anaphora resolution is determined by what is said. But is this all? Or to what extent is anaphora resolution also influenced by what is not said but could have been said? We present a questionnaire, a self-paced reading study and a corpus analysis, suggesting that the existence of possible alternative constructions and referring expressions helps to constitute preferences for anaphora in referentially ambiguous sentences and also affects online sentence processing. These disambiguating effects may be understood as conversational implicatures licensed by pragmatic principles

Out-of-vocabulary (OOV) keywords present a challenge for keyword search (KWS) systems especially in the low-resource setting. Previous research has centered around approaches that use a variety of subword units to recover OOV words. This work systematically investigates morphology-based subword modeling approaches on seven low-resource languages. We show that using morphological subword units (morphs) in speech recognition decoding is substantially better than expanding word-decoded lattices into subword units including phones, syllables and morphs. As alternatives to graphemebased morphs, we apply unsupervised morphology learning to sequences of phonemes, graphones and syllables. Using one of these phone-based morphs is almost always better than using the grapheme-based morphs, but the particular choice varies with the language. By combining the different methods, a substantial gain is obtained over the best single case for all languages, especially for OOV performance.

No abstract

There is a very plausible transitivity principle for theory choice. It says that if all criteria of theory evaluation are considered, and theory A is a better theory than theory B, and theory B is a better theory than theory C, then A is a better theory than C. I argue against this principle. It turns out that whenever there are two or more relevant and independent criteria of theory evaluation, and that whenever at least of one the criteria is 'nonlinear' in a certain sense, there may be violations of transitivity that do not violate any standards of rationality (of theory choice). This shows, again, that theory choice cannot be seen as merely the application of given rules of rational theory choice. 1. Introduction. Suppose there is good evidence for assuming that Mary has gone swimming (p): She has told me so yesterday. However, there is even better evidence that she has not gone swimming, but is in her office instead (q): The office door is wide open-as I can clearly see. But there is even better evidence that she is not in her office, but in the copying room (r): I have just met Jack, who never ever lies and who is very reliable; he tells me that he's just seen Mary at the copying machine. Let us also assume that the quality of the evidence is the only thing that counts with respect to the rational acceptance of the three propositions in the example. We can then say that if the person has better evidence for one proposition (q) than another (p), then she has better reasons to accept q than to accept p. One could also say: She is better justified in accepting q than in accepting p. Let ' ' stand for 'the person [e.g., R(q, p)

Epistemological contextualism ‐ the claim that the truth‐value of knowledge‐attributions can vary with the context of the attributor ‐ has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist has to accept a relationalist version of contextualism.

Classical empiricism leads to notorious problems having to do with the (at least prima facie) lack of an acceptable empiricist justification of empiricism itself. Bas van Fraassen claims that his idea of the "empirical stance" can deal with such problems. I argue, however, that this view entails a very problematic form of voluntarism which comes with the threat of latent irrationality and normative inadequacy. However, there is also a certain element of truth in such a voluntarism. The main difficulty consists in finding an acceptable form of voluntarism.Keywords Empiricism · Empirical stance · Epistemic voluntarism · Bas van Fraassen Empiricism can be very roughly characterized as the view that our knowledge about the world is based on sense experience. Our knowledge about the world is "based" on sense experience in the sense that we could not know what we know without relying on sense experience. This leaves open the possibility that sense experience is only necessary but not sufficient for the knowledge based upon it-as long as the nonempirical elements are not themselves sufficient for the relevant piece of knowledge. The basing relation is not just a genetic one but also a justificatory one: Sense experience does not only lead to beliefs which happen to count as knowledge but also qualifies them as knowledge.In his important book The Empirical Stance Bas van Fraassen characterizes traditional empiricism at one point in a more negative way-as involving the rejection of "metaphysical" explanations which proceed by postulating the existence of something