Animal ethics has often been criticized for an overreliance on “ideal” or even “utopian” theorizing. In this article, I recognize this problem, but argue that the “nonideal theory” which critics have offered in response is still insufficient to make animal ethics action-guiding. I argue that in order for animal ethics to be action-guiding, it must consider agent-centered theories of change detailing how an ideally just human-animal coexistence can and should be brought about. I lay out desiderata that such a theory of change should suffice so as to be helpful in guiding action. Specifically, a theory of change should determine (1) who needs to do what in order for ideal justice to be achieved in the long run, (2) who should be expected to refuse compliance and how they should be moved to comply, and (3) why specific intermediate steps are necessary. I show how previous “nonideal” contributions, though helpful in other ways, are insufficiently determinate on these points and I sketch a (still somewhat utopian) theory of change for one specific context. This brings animal ethics a crucial step closer to being action-guiding in the real world.

This chapter introduces the idea of ‘Kantianism for Animals’: An amended version of Kant’s moral philosophy which recognises duties towards animals. If Kantianism includes animals as moral patients, animal ethicists can put Kantian philosophical resources—notions, distinctions, arguments—to more helpful, creative, and interesting use. Furthermore, including duties to animals in a Kantian framework shows that tying morality to autonomy is not sufficient to deny moral status to animals. The chapter also makes explicit the book’s agenda: Kant’s philosophy is to be used constructively, it is to be revised, and duties to animals are to be set on equal philosophical footing with duties to other human beings.

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This chapter presents a critical overview of the debate about Kant’s ‘indirect duty’ approach to animal ethics. According to Kant’s view, we have no duties ‘towards’ animals, but only ‘regarding’ them. Specifically, we have a duty to cultivate our capacity for sympathy and gratitude in our interactions with animals. Philosophers have advanced two main lines of objection against this view: First, it contains a contradiction, secondly, it is too weak in its demands. The chapter reconstructs the debate and argues that Kantian defences against these objections have not been sufficient. It adds the novel argument that Kant’s view also fails to be helpful in the way Kantian philosophy is supposed to be, since it undermines trust in ordinary moral feelings rather than reinvigorating it.

This chapter summarises Kantianism for Animals, a Kantian view which puts duties towards animals and human beings on equal philosophical footing. It highlights five claims which together make the view distinctive in animal ethics: (1) Duties derive their bindingness from autonomy; (2) Duties have primacy over moral rights and claims; (3) We have a duty to others to promote their happiness, and a duty to self to promote our own moral perfection; (4) We ought to reconcile practical love for animals with a maxim of non-exaltation; (5) Ends, maxims, and incentives matter for moral worth. The chapter discusses how these claims set Kantianism for Animals apart from prominent received views in animal ethics, including the views of Regan and Korsgaard.