Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness

Keller, Pierre

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487231

Cited by 75 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…The partitioning of the argument into these two parts does not constitute an assumption in Kant that intuitions may be taken to be without synthetic unity; see some indications in the main text above and in the following, including footnotes. For a contestation of this interpretation, see Henrich , 645–6, and from the ensuing discussion, see, e.g., Tuschling , 34–96; Evans , 554–60; Longuenesse , 70, n. 17, 111, n. 14; Keller , 88–94, all with further references.…”

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confidence: 99%

Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach

Eng

2014

Ratio Juris

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In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls.

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confidence: 99%

Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach

Eng

2014

Ratio Juris

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“…2 2 Recent books on the topic include Ameriks 2000, Brook 1994, Keller 1998, Kitcher 1990, and Powell 1990. …”

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Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge

Boyle

2008

Philos Phenomenol Research

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I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of selfknowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is in an important sense fundamental, since it is intimately connected with the very capacity for rational reflection, and since it must be present in any creature that understands the first-person pronoun. Moreover, I suggest that these thoughts about self-knowledge have a Kantian provenance.

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“…the refined analyses of Kitcher 1999. More extensive readings are to be found in Keller 1998 andPowell 1990. 11 Here lies the reason why Kant often equates transcendental synthesis with the transcendental unity of apperception: "This amounts to saying, that I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations -to be entitled the original synthetic unity of apperception" (Kant 1998, B135).…”

Section: Ego-splitting As Unexplainable Fact In Kantmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s Reappraisal

Cavallaro

2019

The Subject(s) of Phenomenology

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In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant's own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl's extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking.

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Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness

Cited by 75 publications

References 0 publications

Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach

Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach

Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge

Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s Reappraisal

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