Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s Reappraisal

Cavallaro, Marco

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29357-4_7

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Typically, the selfalteration produced by the splitting or doubling of our experience is non-pathologic, since it is a necessary condition for our acts of reflection, representation, and imagination (cf. Cavallaro, 2020). However, the splitting assumes a new meaning in schizophrenia because self-duplication loses its dynamic character and becomes a pathological type of self-fragmentation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For Husserl, our ability to distance ourselves from the natural attitude relies on a particular type of self-alienation, also known as Ego-splitting or doubling (cf. Cavallaro, 2020), that we experience in different kinds of acts. For instance, in natural selfreflection, we can direct our thematizing attention to some activity we perform by means of a "perception of a higher type" (Husserl, 2019, 291).…”

Section: Framing Natural Self-evidence: the Intersubjective Dimension...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Selfhood and alterity: schizophrenic experience between Blankenburg and Tatossian

Guardascione¹

2023

Front. Psychol.

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This paper presents a critical comparison between two phenomenological accounts of schizophrenic experience: on the one side, Blankenburg’s seminal work on the basal disturbance (Grundstörung) of schizophrenia as loss of natural self-evidence (Natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit); on the other side, Tatossian’s insight, briefly elaborated in a lecture presented in Heidelberg in 1994 and largely forgotten by the relevant literature. Whereas the former mainly develops an intersubjective reading of schizophrenia, the latter suggests an intrasubjective understanding. Indeed, for Blankenburg, schizophrenic experience can be broadly characterized as a progressive impoverishment of our rootedness in the social world, leading to derealization and depersonalization. In this respect, Tatossian takes schizophrenic autism not as the effect of a loss of originary sociality but as the result of a deeper disproportion. For Tatossian, schizophrenia is characterized, ultimately, by a basic self-disorder or alteration that consists in the breakdown of the twofold dimension of transcendental subjectivity, encompassing both constituting consciousness and phenomenologizing onlooker. In this sense, his interpretation of schizophrenic disorders is closer to the ipseity-disturbance model. I show that while Blankenburg and Tatossian share a dialectical understanding of schizophrenia by pointing to basic modifications of the “transcendental organization” of experience, their divergence originates from a different reading of the phenomenological epoché. Except for the clinical perspective, the point of contention between Blankenburg and Tatossian seems to concern their use of internal resources of the Husserlian phenomenology. By presenting the philosophical presuppositions of their analyses, I discuss two key figures of phenomenological psychopathology by showing how their debate on the meaning of schizophrenic experience can be reframed by looking at the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity in Husserl’s phenomenology.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Framing Natural Self-evidence: the Intersubjective Dimension...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Selfhood and alterity: schizophrenic experience between Blankenburg and Tatossian

Guardascione¹

2023

Front. Psychol.

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“…Compare Shoemaker's example of "I see a canary" and "I saw a canary"(Shoemaker 2001, 85).22 For an insightful paper on the topic of I-splitting, and simultaneous differentiation and identification of the I with itself, see(Cavallaro 2020). …”

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confidence: 99%

The essential indexical and self-consciousness: 'I', 'now', and 'here' as aspects of self-consciousness

Jurić¹

2022

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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This paper aims to analyse egocentric indexicals 'I', 'now', and 'here' as different aspects of the same self-conscious or self-referential act emphasising the underlying phenomenological structure of the essential indexical 'I'. What makes an indexical essential is not its indexicality but the egocentric mental state indicated by its use. Therefore, interpreting them only in the confines of language severely limits the scope of the investigation. First, I will define the pure use of 'here', 'now', and 'I', which will consequently lead to the relation between the indexical 'I' and the pure I, and the transcendental designation of the subject. In the second part of the paper, the focus will shift towards the phenomenological notions of primal I with its contextualisation and to the dimensions of 'now' and 'here', analysed through the character of nunc stans. Through some ideas of Husserl and Heidegger, 'here' and 'now' will emerge as amalgamated with the I. It will be shown that they acquire their formal meaning, along with the empirical content, through the I, which is the actual I of immediate presence that is purely self-referring, and that other indexicals and pronouns are thus derivative. It will be concluded that the essentiality of the indexical 'I' has its origin in the very structure of pure self-consciousness. In that regard, the theory of the essential indexical 'I' could be interpreted as an extension of the doctrine of the pure or transcendental I.

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“… Husserl (Hua VIII, p. 94) also speaks of a multiplication of selves (Ichvervielfältigung) or a duplication of the self (Ichverdoppelung), which is thought to be essential to, e.g., phantasy(Bernet 2004, p. 6) and recollection(Cavallaro 2019). The metaphors of multiplication and duplication, however, suggest a replication of both the subjective and the objective side.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Embodied Self and the Paradox of Subjectivity

Durt

2019

Husserl Stud

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While it seems obvious that the embodied self is both a subject of experience and an object in the world, it is not clear how, or even whether, both of these senses of self can refer to the same self. According to Husserl, the relation between these two senses of self is beset by the "paradox of human subjectivity." Following Husserl's lead, scholars have attempted to resolve the paradox of subjectivity. This paper categorizes the different formulations of the paradox according to the dimension each pertains to and considers the prospects of each proposed resolution. It will be shown that, contrary to the claims of the respective authors, their attempted resolutions do not really resolve the paradox, but instead rephrase it or push it to the next dimension. This suggests that there is something deeper at work than a mere misunderstanding. This paper does not aim to resolve the paradox but instead initiates a new approach to it. Instead of seeing the paradox as a misapprehension that needs to be removed, I dig deeper to reveal its roots in ordinary consciousness. Investigating the proposed resolutions will reveal the fundamental role of the natural attitude, and I will argue that already the general thesis of the natural attitude makes the decisive cut that leads to what Sartre calls a "fissure" in pre-reflective self-awareness. The phenomenological reduction deepens the cut into what Husserl calls the "split of the self," which in turn engenders the paradox of subjectivity. The paradox's roots in the structure of ordinary consciousness not only constitute a reason for its persistence, but also suggest a new way to further investigate the embodied self.

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Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s Reappraisal

Cited by 5 publications

References 15 publications

Selfhood and alterity: schizophrenic experience between Blankenburg and Tatossian

Selfhood and alterity: schizophrenic experience between Blankenburg and Tatossian

The essential indexical and self-consciousness: 'I', 'now', and 'here' as aspects of self-consciousness

The Embodied Self and the Paradox of Subjectivity

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