Why Reflective Equilibrium? II : Following Up on R awls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a K antian Approach

2014

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In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls's reflective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach.

Section: Rawls's Reflective Equilibrium As An External Object In Consupporting

confidence: 60%

Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool

2014

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“…In the present discussion, I shall argue the same point with respect to the level of justification in particular: A justification for the choice of mode of justification seems to lead us to transcendental proofs in Kant's sense, and such proofs, again, seem to lead us to transcendental‐idealist premises. A central premise of this kind is freedom (Eng 2014a; 2014b, secs. 3–4).…”

Section: The Problem To Be Discussedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here I content myself with these extremely stylised objects of comparison, so as merely to indicate the direction in which one might possibly find a solution to the issue in question here; this suffices at the present step in the argument. Later I shall discuss in greater detail what a Kantian approach to the issue of choice of mode of justification might look like (Eng ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Suffice it to say that I consider the discussion here in the main to be complementary, not contradictory, to discussions that point to a lack of clarity as regards the relationship between Rawls's theory and ontological or epistemological positions. See further Eng and .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, Albert's framing of the justificatory problem situation excludes the possibility of transcendental arguments and does so by means of a circle without justificatory force; see Kuhlmann , 5–6 including n. 5, et passim. In Eng and , I shall present a Kantian approach to the issue of choice of mode of justification. This approach can be read as an exemplification of transcendental arguments as a fourth alternative and, in consequence, as a resolution of the trilemma.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification

2014

Self Cite

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice.

Concept or Context? The Exchanges between Ross and Kelsen on Valid Law and Efficacy

2023

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The aim of this paper is to point out the salient patterns of agreement and disagreement between Alf Ross and Hans Kelsen's analyses of valid law and efficacy. I argue that the disagreement has the character of systemic postulation on the part of both interlocutors. My main thesis is that the disagreement is not one of philosophical principle, but one that must be resolved on the basis of pragmatic considerations, i.e., the choice between the two valid-law schemes pertains neither to necessity nor to truth, but to expediency and values.* I am indebted to Jes Bjarup, Eugenio Bulygin, Timothy Endicott, and Åke Frändberg for comments on previous versions of the paper, and further to Alexander Molter, Stanley L. Paulson, and the anonymous referees for comments on the submitted version. I am also indebted to Stanley L. Paulson for his comments on the entire manuscript with an eye to matters of English style. The responsibility for any and all remaining shortcomings of whatever kind rests with the author.