Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge

Abstract

I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of selfknowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is in an important sense fundamental, since it is intimately connected with the very capacity for rational reflection, and since it must be present in any creature that understands the first-person pronoun. Moreover, I suggest that these thoughts about self-knowledge have a Kantian provenance.

Self-knowledge about attitudes: rationalism meets interpretation

“…For instance, several authors have advocated so-called "transparency" views of self-knowledge (e.g. Moran 2001;Boyle 2009;Byrne 2011). According to them, the paradigmatic form of agential self-knowledge issues from situations in which we make up our minds through conscious deliberation.…”

Bar-On on Self-Knowledge and Expression

“…Unless otherwise indicated, all page references are to this volume.3 One question that might be raised at this point is whether Bar-On is right to assume that there must be a single account that covers all the kinds of avowals that exhibit some special security. I will not pursue this issue here, but for some grounds for doubting that we should expect a single, uniform account of all kinds of self-knowledge, see my 'Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge'(Boyle 2009). …”

Transparency and introspective unification

“…Different proposals concerning the appropriate interpretation of Evans' observation come fromShoe- maker (1988),Dretske (1994),Gallois (1996),Moran (2001),Fernandez (2013),Bar-On (2004),Byrne (2005),Boyle (2009), andRoessler (2013), to name a few.2 Byrne (2005Byrne ( , 2011aByrne ( , b, c, 2012.3 For alternative routes to pluralism, seeNichols and Stich (2003),Prinz (2004),Goldman (2006),Zim- merman (2008),Boyle (2009), Hill (2009), and Schwitzgebel (2012.…”