Juror judgments in civil cases: Hindsight effects on judgments of liability for punitive damages.

Hastie, Reid; Schkade, David; Payne, John W.

doi:10.1023/a:1022352330466

Cited by 95 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…For example, it has been shown that participants' verdicts of guilt are biased toward the known verdicts of a trial when the defendant is a nonstereotypical offender (Bodenhausen, 1990) and that liability judgments are biased toward a known outcome in railroad accidents (Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999) Tarasoff-type cases (LaBine & LaBine, 1996), and in cases of illegal police searches (Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989). Furthermore, Bryant and Brockway (1997) found that likelihood estimates of a conviction in the O. J. Simpson criminal trial made before the verdict (i.e., the acquittal) were greater than those estimates made by the same participants after the verdict was known.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Surprise influences hindsight–foresight differences in temporal judgments of animated automobile accidents

Calvillo

Gomes

2011

Psychon Bull Rev

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The hindsight bias occurs when people view an outcome as more foreseeable than it actually was. The role of an outcome's initial surprise in the hindsight bias was examined using animations of automobile accidents. Twenty-six participants rated the initial surprise of accidents' occurring in eight animations. An additional 84 participants viewed these animations in one of two conditions: Half stopped the animations when they were certain an accident would occur (i.e., in foresight), and the other half watched the entire animations first and then stopped the animations when they thought that a naïve viewer would be certain that an accident would occur (i.e., in hindsight). When the accidents were low in initial surprise, there were no foresight-hindsight differences; when initial surprise was medium, there was a hindsight bias; and when initial surprise was high, there was a reversed hindsight bias. The results are consistent with a sense-making model of hindsight bias.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Surprise influences hindsight–foresight differences in temporal judgments of animated automobile accidents

Calvillo

Gomes

2011

Psychon Bull Rev

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“…In many of these experiments, people make judgments about uncertain outcomes rather than answer questions about general knowledge. For example, the hindsight bias has been demonstrated in evaluations of sexual assault victims (Carli, 1999;Janoff-Bulman, Timko, & Carli, 1985), football games (Roese & Maniar, 1997), jury decision-making (e.g., Casper, Benedict, & Kelly, 1988;Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999;Robbennolt & Sobus, 1997;Stallard & Worthington, 1998), "gustatory judgments" (Pohl, Schwarz, Sczesny, & Stahlberg, 2003), gambling behavior (Baboushkin, Hardoon, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2001), competitive team decision making (Louie, Curren, & Harich, 2000), determinations of therapist negligence (LaBine & LaBine, 1996), economic expectations (Hölzl, Kirchler, & Rodler, 2002), predictions of the likelihood of violent behavior (Cannon & Quinsey, 1995), and medical diagnoses (Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981).…”

Section: Research On the Hindsight Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not the same old hindsight bias: Outcome information distorts a broad range of retrospective judgments

Bradfield

Wells

2005

Mem Cogn

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The hindsight bias (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975) illustrates that outcome information can make people believe that they would have (or did) predict an outcome that they would not (or did not) actually predict. In two experiments, participants (N ϭ 226) made a prediction immediately before receiving outcome information. Therefore, participants could not distort or misremember their predictions to make them align with the outcome information. In both experiments, participants distorted their reports of how certain they recalled having been in their prediction, how good of a basis they had for making the prediction, how long they took to make the prediction, and so forth. Experiment 2 showed that these effects were diminished when participants engaged in private thought about the upcoming questions prior to receiving outcome information, suggesting that the effect is not due to impression management concerns.

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“…Again, research in jury decision making is illustrative. Jury-eligible citizens were much more likely to find a railroad's actions negligent and an accident foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight (Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999). Probability judgments of terror-related risks also appear susceptible to a hindsight bias.…”

Section: Policy Maker Responses To the Public's Probability Neglectmentioning

confidence: 99%

A policy maker’s dilemma: Preventing terrorism or preventing blame

McGraw

Todorov

Kunreuther³

2011

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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Juror judgments in civil cases: Hindsight effects on judgments of liability for punitive damages.

Cited by 95 publications

References 41 publications

Surprise influences hindsight–foresight differences in temporal judgments of animated automobile accidents

Surprise influences hindsight–foresight differences in temporal judgments of animated automobile accidents

Not the same old hindsight bias: Outcome information distorts a broad range of retrospective judgments

A policy maker’s dilemma: Preventing terrorism or preventing blame

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