The authors investigated whether people can feel happy and sad at the same time. J. A. Russell and J. M. Carroll's (1999) circumplex model holds that happiness and sadness are polar opposites and, thus, mutually exclusive. In contrast, the evaluative space model (J. T. Cacioppo & G. G. Berntson, 1994) proposes that positive and negative affect are separable and that mixed feelings of happiness and sadness can co-occur. The authors both replicated and extended past research by showing that whereas most participants surveyed in typical situations felt either happy or sad, many participants surveyed immediately after watching the film Life Is Beautiful, moving out of their dormitories, or graduating from college felt both happy and sad. Results suggest that although affective experience may typically be bipolar, the underlying processes, and occasionally the resulting experience of emotion, are better characterized as bivariate.
Emotion theorists have long debated whether valence, which ranges from pleasant to unpleasant states, is an irreducible aspect of the experience of emotion or whether positivity and negativity are separable in experience. If valence is irreducible, it follows that people cannot feel happy and sad at the same time. Conversely, if positivity and negativity are separable, people may be able to experience such mixed emotions. The authors tested several alternative interpretations for prior evidence that happiness and sadness can co-occur in bittersweet situations (i.e., those containing both pleasant and unpleasant aspects). One possibility is that subjects who reported mixed emotions merely vacillated between happiness and sadness. The authors tested this hypothesis in Studies 1-3 by asking subjects to complete online continuous measures of happiness and sadness. Subjects reported more simultaneously mixed emotions during a bittersweet film clip than during a control clip. Another possibility is that subjects in earlier studies reported mixed emotions only because they were explicitly asked whether they felt happy and sad. The authors tested this hypothesis in Studies 4-6 with open-ended measures of emotion. Subjects were more likely to report mixed emotions after the bittersweet clip than the control clip. Both patterns occurred even when subjects were told that they were not expected to report mixed emotions (Studies 2 and 5) and among subjects who did not previously believe that people could simultaneously feel happy and sad (Studies 3 and 6). These results provide further evidence that positivity and negativity are separable in experience.
When making decisions, people often anticipate the emotions they might experience as a result of the outcomes of their choices. In the process, they simulate what life would be like with one outcome or another. We examine the anticipated and actual pleasure of outcomes and their relation to choices people make in laboratory studies and real-world studies. We offer a theory of anticipated pleasure that explains why the same outcome can lead to a wide range of emotional experiences. Finally, we show how anticipated pleasure relates to risky choice within the framework of subjective expected pleasure theory.
Sacrificial dilemmas, especially trolley problems, have rapidly become the most recognizable scientific exemplars of moral situations; they are now a familiar part of the psychological literature and are featured prominently in textbooks and the popular press. We are concerned that studies of sacrificial dilemmas may lack experimental, mundane, and psychological realism and therefore suffer from low external validity. Our apprehensions stem from three observations about trolley problems and other similar sacrificial dilemmas: (i) they are amusing rather than sobering, (ii) they are unrealistic and unrepresentative of the moral situations people encounter in the real world, and (iii) they do not elicit the same psychological processes as other moral situations. We believe it would be prudent to use more externally valid stimuli when testing descriptive theories that aim to provide comprehensive accounts of moral judgment and behavior.Research on morality has experienced a major resurgence over the past decade. A shift away from rationalist theories that dominated the literature for many years created new theoretical space, prompted new questions, and called for new empirical methods. New stimuli created for laboratory studies have spurred research activity and led to many contributions to our understanding of morality. However, we believe it is now important to revisit the methodological principle of external validity. We question whether behavioral scientists who study morality should be concerned that they have become desensitized to potential limitations of stimuli that have risen in prominence over the past several years. To the extent that researchers seek to develop general theories of morality, their study stimuli must engage the same psychological processes that operate in everyday situations (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998;Mook, 1983).The scholarly literature on moral judgment increasingly features studies that examine people's reactions to "sacrificial dilemmas" (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011), or brief scenarios where the only way to prevent a calamity from affecting a group of people would be to harm someone else or some smaller group. The trade-off in sacrificial dilemmas is not problematic in and of itself. Researchers can learn a great deal from the way people approach tough choices that put different moral considerations in conflict. Our concern, however, is that many sacrificial dilemmas are set in fanciful, sometimes absurd, contexts, and these artificial settings may affect the way people approach the situation and decide what to do. Moral psychology has developed a sophisticated understanding of how people respond to sacrificial dilemmas (Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, in press;Waldmann, Nagel, & Wiegmann, 2012), but we worry that the judgment and decision-making processes people use in these unusual situations may not External Validity in Moral Psychology 537 accurately reflect moral functioning in a broader set of situations. To be clear, our focus in the current paper is on...
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