Attitudes held with strong moral conviction (moral mandates) were predicted to have different interpersonal consequences than strong but nonmoral attitudes. After controlling for indices of attitude strength, the authors explored the unique effect of moral conviction on the degree that people preferred greater social (Studies 1 and 2) and physical (Study 3) distance from attitudinally dissimilar others and the effects of moral conviction on group interaction and decision making in attitudinally homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups (Study 4). Results supported the moral mandate hypothesis: Stronger moral conviction led to (a) greater preferred social and physical distance from attitudinally dissimilar others, (b) intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., friend) and distant relationships (e.g., owner of a store one frequents), (c) lower levels of good will and cooperativeness in attitudinally heterogeneous groups, and (d) a greater inability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disagreements.

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Sacrificial dilemmas, especially trolley problems, have rapidly become the most recognizable scientific exemplars of moral situations; they are now a familiar part of the psychological literature and are featured prominently in textbooks and the popular press. We are concerned that studies of sacrificial dilemmas may lack experimental, mundane, and psychological realism and therefore suffer from low external validity. Our apprehensions stem from three observations about trolley problems and other similar sacrificial dilemmas: (i) they are amusing rather than sobering, (ii) they are unrealistic and unrepresentative of the moral situations people encounter in the real world, and (iii) they do not elicit the same psychological processes as other moral situations. We believe it would be prudent to use more externally valid stimuli when testing descriptive theories that aim to provide comprehensive accounts of moral judgment and behavior.Research on morality has experienced a major resurgence over the past decade. A shift away from rationalist theories that dominated the literature for many years created new theoretical space, prompted new questions, and called for new empirical methods. New stimuli created for laboratory studies have spurred research activity and led to many contributions to our understanding of morality. However, we believe it is now important to revisit the methodological principle of external validity. We question whether behavioral scientists who study morality should be concerned that they have become desensitized to potential limitations of stimuli that have risen in prominence over the past several years. To the extent that researchers seek to develop general theories of morality, their study stimuli must engage the same psychological processes that operate in everyday situations (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998;Mook, 1983).The scholarly literature on moral judgment increasingly features studies that examine people's reactions to "sacrificial dilemmas" (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011), or brief scenarios where the only way to prevent a calamity from affecting a group of people would be to harm someone else or some smaller group. The trade-off in sacrificial dilemmas is not problematic in and of itself. Researchers can learn a great deal from the way people approach tough choices that put different moral considerations in conflict. Our concern, however, is that many sacrificial dilemmas are set in fanciful, sometimes absurd, contexts, and these artificial settings may affect the way people approach the situation and decide what to do. Moral psychology has developed a sophisticated understanding of how people respond to sacrificial dilemmas (Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, in press;Waldmann, Nagel, & Wiegmann, 2012), but we worry that the judgment and decision-making processes people use in these unusual situations may not External Validity in Moral Psychology 537 accurately reflect moral functioning in a broader set of situations. To be clear, our focus in the current paper is on...

This study tested hypotheses generated from an integrative model of political tolerance that derived hypotheses from a number of different social psychological theories (e.g., appraisal tendency theory, intergroup emotion theory, and value protection models) to explain political tolerance following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. A national field study (N = 550) found that immediate post attack anger and fear had different implications for political tolerance 4 months later. The effects of anger on political tolerance were mediated through moral outrage and outgroup derogation, whereas the effects of fear on political tolerance were mediated through personal threat, ingroup enhancement, and value affirmation. Value affirmation led to increased political tolerance, whereas moral outrage, outgroup derogation, ingroup enhancement, and personal threat led to decreased political tolerance. Value affirmation, moral outrage, and outgroup derogation also facilitated post-9/11 psychological closure and increased psychological closure led to greater political tolerance.

The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies-one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election-indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left.

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Author contributions: The 1 st through 4 th and last authors developed the research questions, oversaw the project, and contributed equally. The 1 st through 3 rd authors oversaw the Main Studies and Replication Studies, and the 4 th , 6 th , 7 th , and 8 th authors oversaw the Forecasting Study. The 1 st , 4 th , 5 th , 8 th , and 9 th authors conducted the primary analyses. The 10 th through 15 th authors conducted the Bayesian analyses. The first and 16 th authors conducted the multivariate meta-analysis.

This crowdsourced project introduces a collaborative approach to improving the reproducibility of scientific research, in which findings are replicated in qualified independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published. Our goal is to establish a non-adversarial replication process with highly informative final results. To illustrate the Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) approach, 25 research groups conducted replications of all ten moral judgment effects which the last author and his collaborators had "in the pipeline" as of August 2014. Six findings replicated according to all replication criteria, one finding replicated but with a significantly smaller effect size than the original, one finding replicated consistently in the original culture but not outside of it, and two findings failed to find support. In total, 40% of the original findings failed at least one major replication criterion. Potential ways to implement and incentivize pre-publication independent replication on a large scale are discussed