Is Dishonesty Contagious?

Innes, Robert; Mitra, Arnab

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00470.x

Cited by 92 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…We investigate this effect more formally via a Sobel-Goldman test based on Specifications 1, 2 and (3). 13 This tests finds that the reduction in treatment effects is significant for both the HIGH and the LOW treatment condition (p < 0.01). The sign of the coefficient for the LOW treatment even reverses.…”

Section: Changing Norm Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…This insight is central for understanding the effect of social information on pro-social behaviour in situations where descriptive and injunctive norms are not aligned. Experiment 1 re-investigates this descriptive norm channel first identified in Bicchieri and Xiao [3] adding further robustness by using a non-student subject pool, by employing a modified dictator game with a real-world public good, by using a set of 1 The effects of social information on behaviour are not confined to the domain of generosity, with comparable relationships documented in many other areas such as energy conservation [11], political participation [12], honesty [13], retirement saving [14] and high stakes career choices [15]. social information treatments with a different range of descriptive norms 2 and by an extra treatment that controls for possible anchoring effects in the social information treatments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

See 1 more Smart Citation

From Social Information to Social Norms: Evidence from Two Experiments on Donation Behaviour

Goeschl

Kettner

Lohse

et al. 2018

Games

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While preferences for conformity are commonly seen as an important driver of pro-social behaviour, only a small set of previous studies has explicitly tested the behavioural mechanisms underlying this proposition. In this paper, we report on two interconnected experimental studies that jointly provide a more thorough and robust understanding of a causal mechanism that links social information (i.e., information about the generosity of others) to donations via changing the perception of a descriptive social norm. In a modified dictator game, Experiment 1 re-investigates this mechanism adding further robustness to prior results by eliciting choices from a non-student sample and by implementing an additional treatment that controls for potential anchoring effects implied by the methods used in previous investigations. Experiment 2 adds further robustness by investigating the link between social information, (descriptive) norm perception and giving at the individual, rather than the group average, level. We find that an exogenous variation of social information influences beliefs about others’ contributions (descriptive social norm) and, through this channel, actual giving. An exploratory analysis indicates that this causal relationship is differently pronounced among the two sexes. We rule out anchoring effects as a plausible confound in previous investigations. The key findings carry over to the individual level.

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Section: Changing Norm Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

From Social Information to Social Norms: Evidence from Two Experiments on Donation Behaviour

Goeschl

Kettner

Lohse

et al. 2018

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There is experimental evidence that guilt affects corrupt behavior and that guilt may be influenced by cultural factors (Barr and Serra 2010;Robert and Arnad 2013;Schulze and Frank 2003). There is experimental evidence that guilt affects corrupt behavior and that guilt may be influenced by cultural factors (Barr and Serra 2010;Robert and Arnad 2013;Schulze and Frank 2003).…”

Section: A Corruption Evasion and Culturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…in an economy affects the willingness of individual government officials to engage in corruption. There is experimental evidence that guilt affects corrupt behavior and that guilt may be influenced by cultural factors (Barr and Serra 2010;Robert and Arnad 2013;Schulze and Frank 2003). Perhaps more convincing is the now famous natural experiment identified by Fisman andMiguel (2007, 2008;chapter 4).…”

Section: A Corruption Evasion and Culturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Culture of Corruption, Tax Evasion, and Economic Growth

Ivanyna¹,

Moumouras

Rangazas

2015

Economic Inquiry

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This study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth. The model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries. The calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates, the corruption associated with public investment projects, and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue. The presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant, but not large, negative effects on economic growth. The relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross-country data. The model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare.

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“…Norms play a crucial role in the functioning of any socio-economic system. In particular the norms of trust and honesty are important norms for economic, political and legal development (Guiso et al, 2008;Uslaner, 2008;Rose-Ackerman, 2001a;Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005;Rose-Ackerman, 2001b;Zak and Knack, 2001) as they reduce the riskiness of market transactions in a world of uncertainty and incomplete contracts (Robert and Arnab, 2013). While trust and honesty help facilitate market exchange, a market economy paradigmatically relies on a meritocratic norm-henceforth meritocratic equity or just deserts-to give legitimacy to the inequality of the distribution of income in society.…”

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confidence: 99%

When Foul Play Seems Fair: Dishonesty as a Response to Violations of Just Deserts

2014

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We investigate the norm of just deserts and its effect on honesty. Just deserts is an essential norm in a market society, and honesty is an important factor in economic and social exchange. In particular, we analyze what happens when the social distributive rules betray the reasonable expectation that who deserves more will obtain a larger payoff. Using a formal-theoretic framework-equity theory-we explore the nexus between the perception of just deserts and honesty, combining cross-national survey (WVS) evidence and data from two laboratory experiments-conducted in the United States and Italy-to study whether violations of the principle of just deserts contribute to an increased tolerance for or an engagement in dishonest and corrupt acts. We find convergent evidence that violation of the just deserts norm results in a greater propensity toward self-serving dishonesty, and that this effect is distinct from the effect of inequality. Both the survey and experimental results also indicate that sensitivity to violations of the just deserts norm vary cross-nationally. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for theories of distributive justice and multiple equilibria in societal levels of honesty.

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Is Dishonesty Contagious?

Cited by 92 publications

References 55 publications

From Social Information to Social Norms: Evidence from Two Experiments on Donation Behaviour

From Social Information to Social Norms: Evidence from Two Experiments on Donation Behaviour

The Culture of Corruption, Tax Evasion, and Economic Growth

When Foul Play Seems Fair: Dishonesty as a Response to Violations of Just Deserts

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