No abstract

No abstract

This paper studies determinants and effects of firms' participation in the 33/50 program, which is a voluntary pollution reduction (VPR) program initiated by government regulators. We examine a wide range of explanations for voluntary corporate environmentalism and find evidence in support of an enforcement theory that predicts that (1) VPR participation is rewarded by relaxed regulatory scrutiny, (2) the anticipation of this reward spurs firms to participate in the program, and (3) the program rewards regulators with reduced pollution. We also find that 33/50 participation was more likely for firms operating in states with larger environmentalist constituencies. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

No abstract

This article models strategic interactions between non-identical duopolistic firms and a public interest/environmental organisation (EO) that promotes 'green' production practices by threatening consumer boycotts against 'brown' producers. The article describes when boycotts are deterred by prior firm commitments to be 'green' and, also when a boycott arises in equilibrium, despite symmetric information. When a boycott arises, it is either a small persistent boycott against the 'small firm' in the industry, or a large transitory boycott against the 'large firm' in the industry that prompts the target firm to accede to the boycott demands quickly. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society.