From Social Information to Social Norms: Evidence from Two Experiments on Donation Behaviour

Abstract

While preferences for conformity are commonly seen as an important driver of pro-social behaviour, only a small set of previous studies has explicitly tested the behavioural mechanisms underlying this proposition. In this paper, we report on two interconnected experimental studies that jointly provide a more thorough and robust understanding of a causal mechanism that links social information (i.e., information about the generosity of others) to donations via changing the perception of a descriptive social norm. In a modified dictator game, Experiment 1 re-investigates this mechanism adding further robustness to prior results by eliciting choices from a non-student sample and by implementing an additional treatment that controls for potential anchoring effects implied by the methods used in previous investigations. Experiment 2 adds further robustness by investigating the link between social information, (descriptive) norm perception and giving at the individual, rather than the group average, level. We find that an exogenous variation of social information influences beliefs about others’ contributions (descriptive social norm) and, through this channel, actual giving. An exploratory analysis indicates that this causal relationship is differently pronounced among the two sexes. We rule out anchoring effects as a plausible confound in previous investigations. The key findings carry over to the individual level.

Look to Others Before You Leap: A Systematic Literature Review of Social Information Effects on Donation Amounts

“…If it would function as a reference point, then any number would influence donation behavior by simply working as an unconscious suggestion (i.e., a nudge; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Goeschl et al (2018) found that providing donors with a random number, instead of a number based on a donation amount of a previous donor, did not influence the donation behavior. Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers (2018) argue against the possibility that social information functions as a reference point, because donors in their field experiment did not exactly donate the suggestion amount of 82.…”

“…People tend to value prior information and use this information as a reference point for behavioral adjustments, which is also known as anchoring (Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 1998). Goeschl et al (2018) examined whether social information functions as a mere reference. If it would function as a reference point, then any number would influence donation behavior by simply working as an unconscious suggestion (i.e., a nudge; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).…”

“…Social norms may thus partially explain the relationship between social information and charitable giving. Goeschl et al (2018) conducted a modified dictator game to research causal mechanisms that link social information with donation behavior through influencing social norms. Contrary to the study of Croson et al (2009), the study existed out of two interconnected experiments conducted among a non-student sample with actual donations to an existing public good.…”

“…Several laboratory experiments (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Blake, Rosenbaum, & Duryea, 1955; Cialdini & Schroeder, 1976; Goeschl, Kettner, Lohse, & Schwieren, 2018; Hysenbelli et al, 2013; Jones & McKee, 2004; Klinowski, 2015; Reingen, 1982; Sell & Wilson, 1991; Vesterlund, 2003) and field experiments (Agerström, Carlsson, Nicklasson & Guntell, 2016; Alpizar et al, 2008a, 2008b; Bøg, Harmgart, Huck, & Jeffers, 2012; Croson et al, 2009; Croson, Handy, & Shang, 2010; R. Kawamura, Ida, & Ogawa, 2018; R.…”

“…While most studies focused on examining social information effects on charitable giving report the effect on the individual donation amount, some studies also report the effect on the participation rate. Social information does not always enhance people’s decision to donate (Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers, 2018; Goeschl et al, 2018; Klinowski, 2015; Murphy et al, 2015; Reingen, 1982). However, other studies have found a positive effect on both the individual donation amount and the participation rate (R.…”