This study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth. The model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries. The calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates, the corruption associated with public investment projects, and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue. The presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant, but not large, negative effects on economic growth. The relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross-country data. The model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare.

This paper presents a quantitative theory of development that highlights three mechanisms that relate schooling, fertility, and growth. First, we point out that in the early stages of development, fertility and schooling may rise together as the schooling of younger children increases their relative contribution to family income when they turn working age. Second, the model contains a supply-side theory of schooling that generates a rise in schooling independent of technological change. Third, we introduce a direct negative effect of industrialization on fertility that does not operate through human capital and the quantity-quality tradeoff. An initial quantitative assessment of the theoretical mechanisms is conducted by calibrating and applying the model to United States history from 1800 to 2000. We find that the demise in family production is an important factor reducing fertility in the 19th century and schooling of older children is dominant factor reducing fertility in the 20th century. The same model is applied to England from 1740 to 1940, where we offer two complimentary explanations for the rise in fertility from 1740 to 1820. The first is based on the rapid expansion in the cottage industry and the second on the increased relative productivity of children. We also find that the subsequent fall in fertility from 1820 to 1940 cannot be explained without introducing child labor/compulsory schooling laws. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006Economic development, Fertility, Schooling, Family production,

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This paper reexamines the condition $E\{\ln r\} > \ln $ (1 + n), which Zilcha (1991) presents as a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic inefficiency of stationary allocations in overlapping generation models with stochastic production. We show that this condition is necessary but not sufficient for a stationary allocation to be dynamically inefficient by Zilcha’s definition. We also show that there is a narrow but widely studied class of specifications in which the Zilcha test is both necessary and sufficient for dynamic inefficiency of stationary competitive equilibrium allocations. Outside this class, however, counterexamples can be constructed relatively easily. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005Dynamic inefficiency, Zilcha criterion.,