Institutions, arrangements and preferences for inflation stability: Evidence and lessons from a panel data analysis

Krause, Stefan; Mendez, Fabio

doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2006.11.001

Cited by 26 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…The link between the 1980-1998 mean value of the KM and CONS measures is even stronger (cf. the bottom plot of Figure 5); the corresponding Pearson Precisely, we refer to the extended sample of countries considered in Krause and Méndez (2008). coefficient reaches 85.8% in this case.…”

Section: Comparing Cons To Existing Measures Of Cbcmentioning

confidence: 82%

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A Simple Empirical Measure of Central Banks' Conservatism

Levieuge¹,

Lucotte

2014

Southern Economic Journal

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In this paper we suggest a simple empirical and model-independent measure of Central Banks' Conservatism, based on the Taylor curve. This new indicator can easily be extended in time and space, whatever the underlying monetary regime of the considered countries. We demonstrate that it evolves in accordance with the monetary experiences of 32 OECD member countries from 1980, and is largely equivalent to the model-based measure provided by Krause & Méndez [Southern Economic Journal, 2005]. We finally bring forward the interest of such an indicator for further empirical analysis dealing with the preferences of Central Banks.

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Section: Comparing Cons To Existing Measures Of Cbcmentioning

confidence: 82%

“… , ) precisely examine the effects of institutional and political factors on their CBC measure but without controlling for the shocks, for the governments' preferences, nor for the potential effects of structural breaks.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Simple Empirical Measure of Central Banks' Conservatism

Levieuge¹,

Lucotte

2014

Southern Economic Journal

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“…We extend the work by Huang and Wei (2006) and Wu (2008) 1 on the effect of corruption on monetary policy choice combining with the framework of Ismihan and Ozkan (2004), Eijffinger and Hoerberichts (2008) and Krause and Méndez (2008) on the effect of CBI on monetary policy choice. A loss of central bank independence, defined here as a full or partial inability to manipulate its chosen policy instrument, can be viewed in many respects as an institutional weakness.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Corruption, central bank (in)dependence and optimal monetary policy in a simple model

Cavoli

Wilson

2015

Journal of Policy Modeling

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“…Ball and Sheridan, 2005). In related analyses, Johnson (2002) uses a series of dummy variables to capture the number of years for which the country has been an inflation targeter while Krause and Mendez (2008) use separate dummies to distinguish between full and flexible inflation targeters. We did not find any examples in the literature that distinguish more finely among inflation targeting countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SeeKrause and Mendez (2008) for a useful summary of this strand of literature.Inflation targeting and financial market volatility…”

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confidence: 99%

Inflation targeting and financial market volatility

O'Sullivan

Tomljanovich

2012

Applied Financial Economics

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We construct an inflation-targeting index for a group of seven Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries that ranks countries according to the key features of formal inflation targeting regimes. The relationship between this index and bond markets is empirically examined to investigate whether inflation targeting reduces the mean of the conditional volatility of the difference between actual yields and those predicted by the expectations hypothesis. We find that the adoption of a more stringent inflation-targeting regime is generally associated with a statistically significant drop in conditional volatility, suggesting that inflation targeting reduces noise in bond markets.

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Institutions, arrangements and preferences for inflation stability: Evidence and lessons from a panel data analysis

Cited by 26 publications

References 35 publications

A Simple Empirical Measure of Central Banks' Conservatism

A Simple Empirical Measure of Central Banks' Conservatism

Corruption, central bank (in)dependence and optimal monetary policy in a simple model

Inflation targeting and financial market volatility

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