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This paper presents new empirical evidence regarding the cyclicality of skill acquisition activities. The paper studies both training and schooling episodes at the individual level using quarterly data from the NLSY79 for a period of 19 years. We find that aggregate schooling is strongly countercyclical, while aggregate training is acyclical. Several training categories, however, behave procyclically. The results also indicate that firm-financed training is procyclical, while training financed through other means is countercyclical; and that the cyclicality of skill acquisition investments depends significantly on the educational level and the employment status of the individual. (JEL E24, E32, I20, J24)

How do the number of trade partners and the concentration of trade among partners affect the economic growth of a country? We refer to these characteristics as the structure of trade, and explore this question empirically in this study. We find that the structure of trade, independently of the level of trade itself, has an important effect on the rate of economic growth. The results of the study suggest that the number of trading partners is positively correlated with growth across all countries, and this effect is more pronounced for rich countries. Trade concentration is positively correlated with growth for all countries, and the effect is concentrated in poor countries. Previous work has overlooked these characteristics of trade, although we find them to be quite relevant and that they could lead to new ways of understanding the trade�-�growth relationship.Trade, growth, trade structure, trade concentration,

In this paper, we study whether voters are more likely to "vote out" a corrupt incumbent than to re-elect him. Specifically, we examine whether they retract their support from political candidates who they think are corrupt by looking at changes in an index of corruption perceptions between the current and the last elections. Our results suggest that corruption in public office is effectively punished by voters. Furthermore, our findings support the idea that both the political system and the democratic experience are important determinants of the voters' reaction and control of corruption; while voters in countries with parliamentary systems or with relatively low levels of democracy react negatively to an increase in corruption, no perceptible effect of this kind was found in countries with mature democracies, and the evidence is inconclusive in the case of countries with presidential systems. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

We generate data on the relative preferences of policy makers for inflation and output stability and reexamine how policy makers and political parties behave for 24 countries by using this new approach. This behavior is essential in both the partisan cycle models and the opportunistic political cycle analysis. Our evidence suggests that right-wing parties exhibit a higher relative preference towards stabilizing inflation than left-wing parties. We obtain mixed results on the opportunistic behavior of incumbent parties. Finally, when we analyze the behavior of left and right ideologies separately, we find overwhelming support for party resemblance in the electoral year, and strong evidence of opportunistic conduct by right-wing parties.

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