2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2015.03.012
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Corruption, central bank (in)dependence and optimal monetary policy in a simple model

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Cited by 9 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…18. See Cavoli and Wilson (2015) for one of these theoretical models which supposes a link between corruption and central bank non-independence.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…18. See Cavoli and Wilson (2015) for one of these theoretical models which supposes a link between corruption and central bank non-independence.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, we have very little idea about corruption in the world's central banks. Only a few studies like Jafari-Samimi and Ahmad ( 2001) and Cavoli and Wilson (2015) have attempted to grapple with the question directly. Researchers' sluggishness to collect these data reflects both the opacity and the general view of central banks as technocratic and insulated from corrupt incentives [14].…”
Section: Central Bank Purchasesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, corruption can increase fiscal deficits and lead to substantial debt accumulation (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998;Kaufmann, 2010;Achury et al, 2015). Corruption is sometimes coupled with fiscal dominance, leading to inflation and eroding the independence of monetary policy (Huang and Wei, 2006;Cavoli and Wilson, 2015). Furthermore, perception of extenstive corruption can lead to increased borrowing costs via higher risk premia and higher default risk (e.g., Akitoby and Stratmann, 2010).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the same line, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) find that some public expenditure policies perform most poorly in places with high corruption. Cavoli and Wilson (2015) show that corruption imposes an inflationary bias on the optimal monetary policy, and Kunieda,…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%