There is a vast literature on the causes and consequences of corruption. A common theme is the belief that countries which exhibit a low level of political competition are more likely to have higher levels of corruption. The model presented here examines the effect of corruption on environmental policy under varying degrees of political competition. An important feature of this model, which has received far less attention in the literature, is that corruption may occur at different levels. A polluting firm attempts to reduce the amount of an environmental tax it pays by bribing a low level bureaucrat to make false reports regarding emission levels. In addition, it also makes contributions to the incumbent and rival parties of government in order to influence key policy parameters. The model thus provides a picture of the relationship between political competition, environmental outcomes and the type of corruption which may be observed. It is shown that higher levels of political competition result in more stringent regulations and better environmental outcomes. Political competition also has the capacity to reduce both grand and petty corruption, however, this is not assured. The model also suggests that polluting interests may have an incentive to corrupt opposition parties in order to weaken their political position. This may lead to policy convergence even when political competition is strong. Political competition is indicated as a necessary but not sufficient means by which to combat corruption.

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Braverman wrote: &dquo;The transformation of working humanity into a 'labor force,' a 'factor of production,' an instrument of capital, is an incessant and unending process.&dquo;' This essay is about one part of that process, the industrial recreation movement. Industrial recreation is the term used to describe those recreation activities that are provided by management to satisfy the perceived needs and desires of employees for wholesome and enriching leisure time experiences. Management programs to provide this kind of employee benefit can be traced back to the middle of the nineteenth century, but they only became a significant part of management strategies in the first decades of the present century, when, due to a reduction in the work week, more leisure time became available to the industrial worker. In what follows, we will show that the greater productivity afforded by advanced technology, and the greater amount of free time this provided, constituted both a blessing and a curse to management. We will show too that most businessmen feared the consequences of expanded leisure time and sought to control their employee's use of free time in the interests of protecting their investment in this &dquo;instrument of capital.&dquo; In the course of this essay we hope to show how, in a more general way, the meaning of the new leisure was very much influenced by the new ideas about work that emerged with the growth of monopoly capital and scientific management and that work and leisure represent but &dquo;different expressions of the extension of productive relations into every comer of our lives. &dquo;2 1. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly

"Professional team sports represent an important aspect of Australian life. Interest is great, and a significant portion of household expenditure is directed toward sports-related goods and services. Based on international comparisons and on the size of attendance and television revenues, the sector should be highly profitable. Yet, significant amounts of public funding and regulatory exemptions are afforded to team sports in Australia. This article analyses the magnitude and reasons for government spending that subsidises professional team sports." Copyright (c)2009 The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research.

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Professional team sports enjoy subsidies from government, as well as regulatory exemption from standards that apply to other sectors of the economy. The Australian sports economics literature has, however, focused on competitive balance, with few studies examining government policies. This paper examines government policies such as subsidies, mega-event bidding, salary caps and player draft systems. We argue that the peculiar nature of professional sports provides some justification for such distinctive government policies. However, there is need for greater transparency, better-directed funding, and genuine public debate on some of these policies to enable considered evaluation of their benefits and costs.

Were tariff rates in the Australian colony of Victoria directed towards growth‐enhancing industries or rent seekers? Recent research suggests tariffs may be welfare enhancing if they are directed at industries with positive externalities; something more likely when institutions are strong. Using disaggregated tariff data for the years 1872, 1880, and 1890, we analyse the relationship between industry characteristics and tariffs, finding little evidence that Victorian industries with positive externalities received tariff protection. Our results throw doubt on good institutions necessarily producing good tariff outcomes and suggest the relationship between tariffs and growth is more complex than current studies assume.