Influência da governança corporativa no custo da dívida de companhias abertas familiares

Abstract

O estudo verificou a influência da governança corporativa no custo da dívida de companhias abertas familiares. Para tal, realizou-se pesquisa descritiva, documental e quantitativa em uma amostra de companhias familiares que possuíam dados disponíveis para o período de 2012 a 2017. Para mensurar o custo da dívida, identificou-se a razão entre as despesas financeiras e o passivo oneroso. Para governança corporativa foram utilizadas: a) aderência ao novo mercado; b) possuir membros independentes no conselho de administração; c) percentual de membros independentes no conselho; d) maioria de membros independentes no conselho; e) não dualidade no cargo de CEO e de presidente do conselho. Os resultados evidenciaram que a governança corporativa não influencia uma redução no custo da dívida em empresas familiares.

Efeito da estrutura do conselho de administração na retenção de caixa das companhias abertas

“…The board of directors is one of the main internal corporate governance mechanisms and serves as supervisor of business activities, besides being responsible for helping investors to make decisions and minimize the irregular actions of managers, through the alignment of interests between investors, creditors and managers (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008;Chancharat, Krishnamurti & Tian, 2012;Nisiyama & Nakamura, 2018;Einsweiller, Moura & Kruger, 2020;Moura et al, 2020).…”

“…In general, independent directors, i.e. external directors who do not have family relationships, business or any other type, are considered more effective in monitoring management, because they do not depend on internal directors (executives) for the promotion of positions and for the less likelihood of acting for the benefit of the controllers (Harford, Mansi & Maxwell,2008;Al-Najjar, 2015;Azeez, 2015;Einsweiller, Moura & Kruger, 2020).…”

“…The board of directors also represents an important part of the structure of the organizations, since the directors are the representatives of the shareholders within the company, have as their function the monitoring of management and assist in decision-making and control of activities (Nisiyama & Nakamura, 2018;Einsweiller, Moura & Kruger, 2020). According to the IBGC (2015), this board has the responsibility to discuss, approve and/or supervise issues involving strategy, remuneration, risk, independent audit, capital structure and people management policies.…”

“…The independent variables of interest are: (1) board independence (independence), ratio between the number of independent members of the board of directors and the total number of members of the board of directors (Harford, Mansi & Maxwell, 2008;Al-Najjar, 2015;Azeez, 2015;Ghouma, Ben-Nasr & Yan, 2018;Einsweiller, Moura & Kruger, 2020;Moura et al , 2020); (2) CEO duality (duality), represented by a dummy variable that assumes the value one (1) if the positions of Chairman of the board of directors and CEO are held by the same individual and zero (0) otherwise (Dahya, Lonie & Power, 2006;Harford, Mansi & Maxwell, 2008;Al-Najjar, 2015;Azeez, 2015;Ghouma, Ben-Nasr & Yan, 2018;Einsweiller, Moura & Kruger 2020;Moura et al , 2020); and (3) board size (boardsize), natural logarithm of the number of board members (Harford, Mansi & Maxwell, 2008;Al-Najjar, 2015;Azeez, 2015). 2009 Control variables, based on previous research on cash holding, are considered in an attempt to avoid estimating skewed parameters.…”

“…Moreover, companies with higher returns have greater ease time paying off their loans (Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010) and then, as the cost of debt tends to be lower, the leftover cash tends to be higher. Return on asset, division of profit before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization by total assets, as a proxy for profitability (Acharya, Almeida & Campello, 2007;Einsweiller, Moura & Kruger, 2020). v) Firm size (firmsize): smaller companies are expected to have higher levels of cash because they are generally considered less diversified and less stable and because they are subject to higher transaction costs (Opler et al, 1999;Faulkender, 2002).…”