Inadequate Budgets and Salaries as Instruments for Institutionalizing Public Sector Corruption in Indonesia

McLeod, Ross H.

doi:10.5367/000000008785260464

Cited by 25 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The faults of the DP3 system have been known for many years, but its non-threatening nature has probably ensured its support within the civil service and hence its longevity (Rohdewohld 1995). If an effective performance management system had been in operation, this would have threatened the ample opportunities for extra allowances and corrupt activities that were built into the design of the New Order public service (McLeod 2008).…”

Section: Performance Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human resource management: the forgotten dimension of decentralisation in Indonesia

Turner

Imbaruddin

Sutiyono

2009

Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies

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Indonesia has introduced radical decentralisation measures, transferring many functions and much finance to democratically elected sub-national governments. However, human resource management (HRM) has largely been overlooked. Using data obtained from central personnel agencies and nine sub-national governments, this article examines the major elements of HRM at sub-national level: recruitment and selection; promotion and advancement; training and development; remuneration; and performance management. The structure and operation of these elements are compared with those advocated in Strategic HRM, the dominant paradigm of contemporary HRM. The findings are that a centralised, bureaucratised system of HRM remains in place in Indonesia, with many practices retained from the pre-decentralisation period. The HRM system is only minimally linked to strategic concerns and organisational goal achievement. Reforms are essential, but an incremental approach is recommended, keeping the basic framework centralised but creating incentives for reform by making local governments more accountable for personnel costs and performance.

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Section: Performance Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human resource management: the forgotten dimension of decentralisation in Indonesia

Turner

Imbaruddin

Sutiyono

2009

Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies

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“…This lack of outside pressure gave civil servants and state representatives considerable freedom to engage in various forms of rent seeking, effectively imposing an informal tax system in most sectors of the economy (McLeod, ). As long as orders from above were faithfully executed and their superiors were kept happy, civil servants faced little restraint—and often open encouragement—to supplement their meagre budgets and salaries by exploiting state power.…”

Section: Civil Service Reform and The New Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

Incumbent bureaucrats: Why elections undermine civil service reform in Indonesia

Berenschot

2018

Public Admin & Development

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Summary This article develops an explanation for why democratisation processes sometimes fail to foster effective civil service reform. Using ethnographic fieldwork on the evolving relationship between civil servants and politicians in Lampung, a rural backwater in the southern tip in Sumatra, this paper attributes the ineffectiveness of bureaucratic reform measures in Indonesia to the way in which elections trigger competition over control over state resources. I argue that a merit‐based bureaucracy is particularly difficult to institute when a local bureaucracy enjoys strong discretionary control over the distribution of state resources. During Suharto's authoritarian regime, this control rested largely in the hands of bureaucrats. This authoritarian legacy generates strong incentives for politicians to prefer loyal bureaucrats over capable ones. Politicians need to use bureaucratic appointments as a means to obtain campaign support and to develop control over state resources. In developing these arguments, this paper offers an approach to incorporate informal and clientelistic dimensions of politics more explicitly into analyses of processes of bureaucratic reform.

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“…McLeod () shows how the Soeharto regime forced the bureaucrats to become part of a corrupt system in Indonesia—‘the Soeharto franchise'—by setting their salaries strongly below market levels and thereby forcing them to supplement their income through illegal means. At the same time, ‘wet’ positions that allowed extraction of illegal payments were scarce, and lower levels of bureaucracy were overstaffed.…”

Section: Empirical Corruption Analyses On Southeast Asiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research

Kis‐Katos

Schulze

2013

Asian-Pac Economic Lit

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This paper surveys the empirical literature on corruption in Southeast Asia with a focus on the methodological approach that the contributions take to identify the extent, determinants, and consequences of corruption and the remedies against it. We present the major topics that empirical corruption research has focused on and point out the methodological challenges that this line of research has to address. We discuss the empirical corruption studies on Southeast Asia and describe the empirical approach that they have taken.

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Inadequate Budgets and Salaries as Instruments for Institutionalizing Public Sector Corruption in Indonesia

Cited by 25 publications

References 13 publications

Human resource management: the forgotten dimension of decentralisation in Indonesia

Human resource management: the forgotten dimension of decentralisation in Indonesia

Incumbent bureaucrats: Why elections undermine civil service reform in Indonesia

Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research

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