Human resource management: the forgotten dimension of decentralisation in Indonesia

Abstract

Indonesia has introduced radical decentralisation measures, transferring many functions and much finance to democratically elected sub-national governments. However, human resource management (HRM) has largely been overlooked. Using data obtained from central personnel agencies and nine sub-national governments, this article examines the major elements of HRM at sub-national level: recruitment and selection; promotion and advancement; training and development; remuneration; and performance management. The structure and operation of these elements are compared with those advocated in Strategic HRM, the dominant paradigm of contemporary HRM. The findings are that a centralised, bureaucratised system of HRM remains in place in Indonesia, with many practices retained from the pre-decentralisation period. The HRM system is only minimally linked to strategic concerns and organisational goal achievement. Reforms are essential, but an incremental approach is recommended, keeping the basic framework centralised but creating incentives for reform by making local governments more accountable for personnel costs and performance.

Patronage's Progress in Post‐soeharto Indonesia

“…At all levels of government, HRM malpractices such as those identified by Dwiyanto et al (2002Dwiyanto et al ( , 2003 and Turner et al (2009Turner et al ( , 2011 lubricate patronage and are grist to its mill, enabling patrons to do more or less as they please. Examples include little or no formal human resource planning; staffing decisions that are made centrally with no match to local need (Heywood and Harahap, 2009); non-transparent appointments, concealing widespread job purchase, nepotism and influence-peddling (Nugroho, 2011); staffing proposals from local governments that do not specify types or levels of expertise needed; thousands of civil service casual workers employed-as teachers or clerks or in other skilled occupational categories-without formal selection; 'a uniform written test for doctors, teachers, health workers, computer operators, clerks, and no examination of applicants' skills in relation to jobs' (Turner et al, 2009, p. 238); appointments based on ethnicity and kinship and 'feudalism' or hereditary privilege (Dwiyanto et al, 2003); little or no performance appraisal of staff and advancement on the basis of tenure in the job and/or other informal factors, including 'achievements in irregular income generation' (Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006, p. 225) and bribes (Nugroho, 2011); appointments to senior positions beyond retirement age and outside of the formal structure on the basis of 'personal links and loyalty'; where the so-called 'fit-and-proper' tests for employment have been introduced on paper, they are derided as 'fee and prosper tests' in practice (Turner et al, 2009, p. 239); training whose purpose is to generate income for related parties (firms) and travel and accommodation allowances (sometimes from government and donors simultaneously) for government officials; little or no relationship between performance and remuneration; discretionary allowances paid to staff that constitute considerably more than the base pay and that are 'non-transparent and prone to abuse'; few meaningful job descriptions; high absenteeism (particularly among teachers and health care workers) (Chaudhury, Hamme, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers, 2006); conversions of contract to permanent staff that have little or no effect on performance because they are not part of a coherent overall plan (Heywood, Harahap, and Aryani, 2011) 16 ; many 'ghost workers' (Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006); around one million people who have informal contractual arrangements-so-called 'honorary employees'-who are not subject to civil service rules (Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006); and a strictly enforced code of secrecy that is an effective deterrent to whistle-blowing (Nugroho, 2011).…”

Public Administration Reform in Post‐conflict Societies: Lessons From Aceh, Indonesia

“…Reports from other parts of Indonesia suggest that other heads of local government have used 'fit and proper' tests to legitimize political choices. For more details, see Turner et al (2009). Other BKPP officials argued that national legislation and the legal ambiguity of the new special autonomy arrangements for Aceh prevented them from engaging in institutional reform. They argued with AGTP consultants that their hands were tied while regulations specifying Aceh's new special autonomy powers were still being finalized.…”

“…Reports from other parts of Indonesia suggest that other heads of local government have used ‘fit and proper’ tests to legitimize political choices. For more details, see Turner et al ().…”

Incumbent bureaucrats: Why elections undermine civil service reform in Indonesia

“…Kristiansen and Ramli () find, for example, that aspirant bureaucrats still have to pay hefty fees (of up to 27 times their starting salary) in order to enter the civil service. Performance appraisals have little real impact, and promotions similarly require sizable bribes (Turner, Imbaruddin, & Sutiyono, ). On the basis of interviews with civil servants, Blunt, Turner, and Lindroth (, p. 215; see also Blunt et al, ) come to a particularly damning conclusion: “[W] hat matters is who you know, what and who you pay, and to whom you pledge loyalty, [while] initiative, excellence and results matter little” (see also Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, ; Rosser & Fahmi, ; Wihantoro, Lowe, Cooper, & Manochin, ).…”