Incumbent bureaucrats: Why elections undermine civil service reform in Indonesia

Abstract

Summary This article develops an explanation for why democratisation processes sometimes fail to foster effective civil service reform. Using ethnographic fieldwork on the evolving relationship between civil servants and politicians in Lampung, a rural backwater in the southern tip in Sumatra, this paper attributes the ineffectiveness of bureaucratic reform measures in Indonesia to the way in which elections trigger competition over control over state resources. I argue that a merit‐based bureaucracy is particularly difficult to institute when a local bureaucracy enjoys strong discretionary control over the distribution of state resources. During Suharto's authoritarian regime, this control rested largely in the hands of bureaucrats. This authoritarian legacy generates strong incentives for politicians to prefer loyal bureaucrats over capable ones. Politicians need to use bureaucratic appointments as a means to obtain campaign support and to develop control over state resources. In developing these arguments, this paper offers an approach to incorporate informal and clientelistic dimensions of politics more explicitly into analyses of processes of bureaucratic reform.

Entrepreneurship‐driven public management reforms in Southeast Asia: Critical implications for public accountability

“…These percentile ranks in Table 3 demonstrate the need for rethinking public accountability in the current context of entrepreneurial public sector reforms in Southeast Asia. In addition to the erosion of the established democratic modes of accountability and its replacement with apolitical managerial responsiveness (Smyth, 2007), there is also potential for elite capture of such managerial compliance under the rising power of the executive branch in Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Malaysia (Berenschot, 2018; Manaf, 2011).…”

The politics of local government environmental evaluations: Assessing bureaucracy in post-Reformasi Indonesia

“…Decentralisation and direct election bring together administrative and political regime to local governments, which later force bureaucracy to adapt and comply with the daily governing processes (Berenschot, 2018). As elected politicians in top executive positions determine bureaucratic appointment and promotions (Berenschot, 2018, p. 139), patronage and partisanship in bureaucracy becomes unavoidable (Demir, 2017, p. 157).…”

“…In natural resource-rich regions, the pressure sometimes is heightened, given the multiple actors involved within, including those that come from the capital of Jakarta, the related provinces and the regency itself, as well as the huge resource accesses being contested. Yet, bureaucracy is not only politicszed, as Berenschot (2018) argues, they also take part in the game and play politics. Strategic Environmental Studies is a series of systematic, comprehensive and participatory analysis conducted to make sure that sustainable development principles have been made as the basis of and integrated with development activities in particular regions and/or policies, planning, and/or programmes.…”

“…Based on field research conducted in four natural resource rich regions in Indonesia between 2018 and 2019-East Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Java and Bangka Belitung-this article argues that in a situation where elite-driven politics feature most, the face of decision-making processes, bureaucracy also plays politics. Bureaucrats not only play politics during electoral periods by supporting particular candidates to secure their positions in government offices (Berenschot, 2018), but also in the daily making of public policy. The case of environmental evaluation in local governments sheds light clearly on how bureaucracy applies particular political approach in environmental governance.…”

The Political Process of Bureaucratic Reform: Wonosobo Regional Government Experience from 2011-2015

“…Regarding the process of bureaucratic reform, empirical experiences of several countries reveal that bureaucratic reform is mainly influenced by the political interplay of bureaucrats and politicians (Ricks, 2018;Dasandi & Esteve, 2017;Alexander, Lewis & Considine, 2011) and that regional governments are generally conservative in carrying out downsizing policies due to financial, legal, and political challenges (Berenschot, 2018;Liou & Feldheim, 2018). However, study on the political process of bureaucratic reform focusing on the utilization of influence tactics by pro-reform bureaucrats in carrying out extreme bureaucratic downsizing is scarce.…”