Improved Sample Value Adjustment for Synchrophasor Estimation at Off-Nominal Power System Conditions

Maharjan, Salish; Peng, Jimmy Chih-Hsien; Martinez, Jorge Elizondo; Xiao, Weidong; Huang, Po-Hsu; Kirtley, James L.

doi:10.1109/tpwrd.2016.2586946

Cited by 28 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Even though these techniques can prevent the system from FDIAs to some extent, smart intruders may be still able to damage the PMU (or RTU) measurements in power grids and bypass the bad data detection (BDD) mechanisms in SCADA systems and wide-area measurement system (WAMS) plat-forms [14], [143]- [153] (see Figure 5). This can be accomplished through manipulated measurements and injecting artificially generated data to the basic measurements in power grids [154]- [157].…”

Section: A Fdia Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electric Power Grid Resilience to Cyber Adversaries: State of the Art

et al. 2020

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The smart electricity grids have been evolving to a more complex cyber-physical ecosystem of infrastructures with integrated communication networks, new carbon-free sources of power generation, advanced monitoring and control systems, and a myriad of emerging modern physical hardware technologies. With the unprecedented complexity and heterogeneity in dynamic smart grid networks comes additional vulnerability to emerging threats such as cyber attacks. Rapid development and deployment of advanced network monitoring and communication systems on one hand, and the growing interdependence of the electric power grids to a multitude of lifeline critical infrastructures on the other, calls for holistic defense strategies to safeguard the power grids against cyber adversaries. In order to improve the resilience of the power grid against adversarial attacks and cyber intrusions, advancements should be sought on detection techniques, protection plans, and mitigation practices in all electricity generation, transmission, and distribution sectors. This survey discusses such major directions and recent advancements from a lens of different detection techniques, equipment protection plans, and mitigation strategies to enhance the energy delivery infrastructure resilience and operational endurance against cyber attacks. This undertaking is essential since even modest improvements in resilience of the power grid against cyber threats could lead to sizeable monetary savings and an enriched overall social welfare. INDEX TERMS Cyber physical systems (CPS), cyber attack, intrusion detection system (IDS), false data injection attack (FDIA), energy management system (EMS), power grid resilience.

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Section: A Fdia Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electric Power Grid Resilience to Cyber Adversaries: State of the Art

et al. 2020

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“…Kalman filter also requires a measurement model besides a process model. The estimates of phase, θ k (defined by (10)- (11) and denoted byθ k ), and of frequency, f k (defined by (9) and denoted byf k ), which are obtained in the IDFT stage, are used as measurements for the UKF stage. After incorporating the measurement noise, w k , the measurement model is given as follows.…”

Section: Step 2: Kalman Filteringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rate of Change of Frequency Estimation for Power Systems Using Interpolated DFT and Kalman Filter

Singh

Pal

2019

IEEE Trans. Power Syst.

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This paper presents a new method for estimating rate of change of frequency (RoCoF) of voltage or current signals measured using instrument transformers. The method is demonstrably superior to currently available methods in literature, in terms of estimation-latency and estimation-error. The estimation is performed in two steps. In the first step, the analog voltage or current signal obtained from an instrument transformer is statistically processed using interpolated discrete Fourier transform in order to obtain the means and variances of the signal parameters. These means and variances are then given as inputs to the second step, in which Kalman filtering is used to find the final RoCoF estimate. Accurate mathematical expressions for the means and variances of signal parameters have been derived and used in the second step, which is the main reason behind the superior performance of the method. The applicability of the method has been demonstrated on a benchmark power system model.

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“…Since m n is assumed, the rank of matrix H is R(H ) = n. The state estimation in power system has three principles including maximum similarity principle, weighted least square method, and minimized variable. When the measured noises follow the Gaussian distribution that has mean value of 0 m×l , state value x based on maximum similarity principle can obtained by Eq (2).…”

Section: A State Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

False Data Injection Attacks With Incomplete Network Topology Information in Smart Grid

Wang

2019

IEEE Access

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False data injection (FDI) attack causes a disadvantage to the safety of a power system. In the past, the adversary launching FDI attack mostly needed the complete network topology information of the power system and a large amount of measurements. However, the reality is that the adversary has limited resources and can hardly manipulate massive measurements without being detected. This paper proposes a new method to form attack vector in the condition of incomplete system information. The proposed method first maps the restricted data into a new Jacobian matrix by a kernel-independent component analysis, then constructs the undetectable attack model, and finally, designs a less costly attack vector to accomplish the FDI attack. The experimental results on different IEEE buses with Matpower tool illustrate the validity of the proposed method. Additionally, the proposed method shows a relatively high success rate in the cases of different degrees of incomplete information and various quantities of manipulated data in different power systems.

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Improved Sample Value Adjustment for Synchrophasor Estimation at Off-Nominal Power System Conditions

Cited by 28 publications

References 22 publications

Electric Power Grid Resilience to Cyber Adversaries: State of the Art

Electric Power Grid Resilience to Cyber Adversaries: State of the Art

Rate of Change of Frequency Estimation for Power Systems Using Interpolated DFT and Kalman Filter

False Data Injection Attacks With Incomplete Network Topology Information in Smart Grid

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