False Data Injection Attacks With Incomplete Network Topology Information in Smart Grid

Abstract

False data injection (FDI) attack causes a disadvantage to the safety of a power system. In the past, the adversary launching FDI attack mostly needed the complete network topology information of the power system and a large amount of measurements. However, the reality is that the adversary has limited resources and can hardly manipulate massive measurements without being detected. This paper proposes a new method to form attack vector in the condition of incomplete system information. The proposed method first maps the restricted data into a new Jacobian matrix by a kernel-independent component analysis, then constructs the undetectable attack model, and finally, designs a less costly attack vector to accomplish the FDI attack. The experimental results on different IEEE buses with Matpower tool illustrate the validity of the proposed method. Additionally, the proposed method shows a relatively high success rate in the cases of different degrees of incomplete information and various quantities of manipulated data in different power systems.

Cyber attacks in smart grid – dynamic impacts, analyses and recommendations

“…Several attempts have been performed in the literature to increase the cyber-security of the power grid against possible cyber attacks using steady-state analysis. In [6][7][8][9], authors showed that false data injection (FDI) attacks can mislead the state estimation process of the power grid using topology information of an attackfree system. A comprehensive review of FDI attacks and detection techniques on compromised system topology information can be found in [10,11].…”

Electric Power Grid Resilience to Cyber Adversaries: State of the Art

“…Successful implementation of FDIAs commonly requires full knowledge of the network topology. [139] proposed a form of an attack without having complete information of the network topology. This can be done by using the kernel-independent component analysis to map the restricted data into a new Jacobian matrix, through which the undetectable attack is modeled [139].…”

“…[139] proposed a form of an attack without having complete information of the network topology. This can be done by using the kernel-independent component analysis to map the restricted data into a new Jacobian matrix, through which the undetectable attack is modeled [139]. [140] proposed an extreme learning machine (ELM) technique based on one-class-one-network (OCON) framework to detect any cyber threat on the AC state estimation.…”

Can Multipath TCP be Robust to Cyber Attacks With Incomplete Information?

“…When the exposed region is determined, the attack strategy plays important role to achieve an optimal attack effect under the incomplete information. In the research field of network robustness, there are many attack strategies proposed, such as random attack, degree-based attack, centrality-based attack, and mixed attack [45][46][47][48][49]. Among the many attack strategies, we in this paper adopt the most widely-used "mixed attack strategy" to evaluate the vulnerability and robustness of the MPTCP communication system.…”