Electric Power Grid Resilience to Cyber Adversaries: State of the Art

Abstract

The smart electricity grids have been evolving to a more complex cyber-physical ecosystem of infrastructures with integrated communication networks, new carbon-free sources of power generation, advanced monitoring and control systems, and a myriad of emerging modern physical hardware technologies. With the unprecedented complexity and heterogeneity in dynamic smart grid networks comes additional vulnerability to emerging threats such as cyber attacks. Rapid development and deployment of advanced network monitoring and communication systems on one hand, and the growing interdependence of the electric power grids to a multitude of lifeline critical infrastructures on the other, calls for holistic defense strategies to safeguard the power grids against cyber adversaries. In order to improve the resilience of the power grid against adversarial attacks and cyber intrusions, advancements should be sought on detection techniques, protection plans, and mitigation practices in all electricity generation, transmission, and distribution sectors. This survey discusses such major directions and recent advancements from a lens of different detection techniques, equipment protection plans, and mitigation strategies to enhance the energy delivery infrastructure resilience and operational endurance against cyber attacks. This undertaking is essential since even modest improvements in resilience of the power grid against cyber threats could lead to sizeable monetary savings and an enriched overall social welfare. INDEX TERMS Cyber physical systems (CPS), cyber attack, intrusion detection system (IDS), false data injection attack (FDIA), energy management system (EMS), power grid resilience.

CPS Attacks Mitigation Approaches on Power Electronic Systems With Security Challenges for Smart Grid Applications: A Review

“…The control layers can be implemented in real-time processors. The intrusion into the control layer only permits access to the commanded set-points (frequency, DC-link voltage) throughout the run-time rather than the inner control layers [153].…”

Theoretical framework about optimal model of operation after intentional attacks considering transmission system switching

“…Además de su complejidad intrínseca debido a los dos niveles de optimización, el problema (5) -( 12) es una programación de entero mixto lineal (que contiene variables continuas y binarias) cuyos trabajos se relacionan en [2], [6], [11], [14]- [16], [28] y programación de enteros mixtos no lineal debido al producto de las variables [9] y en (8). Sin embargo, como se describe a continuación, aprovechando el hecho de que el problema de optimización interna es lineal para un vector dado, el problema (5) -( 12) se puede transformar en un problema S-MILP equivalente.…”

“…La gestión de los Sistemas Eléctricos de Potencia SEP ha cambiado en los últimos tiempos con la implementación de redes inteligentes, que se caracterizan por tener modernas tecnologías de comunicación [1], procesamiento de señales y control; permitiendo monitorear las redes eléctricas sin esfuerzo y en áreas amplias [2]. La ubicación y el tamaño de las subestaciones primarias PS son los movimientos estratégicos en la planificación de los sistemas de distribución.…”

“…La información que entrega los autores [2] se basa en un resultados obtenidos en las afectaciones provocadas por los ciberataques en diferentes países que no solo afectan la operatividad del sistema; existen casos en los que la infraestructura sufrió daños considerables y en otros casos se identificó el robo de energía pese a contar con una medición AMI lo cual genera pérdidas millonarias a las compañías eléctricas a nivel mundial. Por lo tanto, la caracterización, el modelado y la evaluación de la vulnerabilidad cibernética de la red eléctrica y el diseño de soluciones para proteger el sistema eléctrico frente a los adversarios cibernéticos son esencial.…”

Intelligent Buildings in Smart Grids: A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues Related to Energy Management

“…Many different incidents have been reported in the power system in the last several years, with the Stuxnet attack marking a turning point because of its virulence and the severe failures that it caused in different countries [26]. Since then, it has been clear that cyber-security must be guaranteed in intelligent power grids as a tool for increasing their resilience face to cyber-attacks [27], including all the different subsystems of the SG, such as MGs and IBs [28,29].…”