Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Szanto, Thomas

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_7

Cited by 29 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 50 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…The integration of emotional experiences is fully consistent with there being complementarity between them, and sharing emotions might often be more an issue of an overarching emotional integration, than of a simple mirroring full matching between emotional experiences. As indicated above, we agree with In an important recent account of shared emotions (Salmela & Nagatsu 2016a, 2016b cf. Salmela 2012), emotional convergence has been spelled out in terms of a "convergence" or "overlapping of concerns".…”

Section: Shared Emotionssupporting

confidence: 92%

“…In previous publications, all three of us have mined and explored insights regarding the link between collective intentionality, communal experiences and shared emotions that can be found in early phenomenology (e.g., Husserl, Scheler, Walther, Stein, etc. ) (León & Zahavi 2016;Szanto 2015Szanto , 2016aSzanto , 2016bZahavi 2016;Zahavi & Salice 2017). Although our present aim is systematic and not historical, we will make productive use of ideas found in phenomenology.…”

Section: Joint Ownership Fusion and Token Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Emotional sharing and the extended mind

2017

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This article investigates the relationship between emotional sharing and the extended mind thesis. We argue that shared emotions are socially extended emotions that involve a specific type of constitutive integration between the participating individuals' emotional experiences. We start by distinguishing two claims, the Environmentally Extended Emotion Thesis and the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis (Section 1). We then critically discuss some recent influential proposals about the nature of shared emotions (Section 2). Finally, in Section 3, we motivate two conditions that an account of shared emotions ought to accommodate: (i) Reciprocal Other-awareness, and (ii) Integration. Consideration of (ii) and discussion of relational accounts of joint attention, lead us to the proposal that a construal of socially extended emotions in terms of a constitutive integration of the participating individuals' experiences is more promising than proposals that simply appeal to various forms of social situatedness, embeddedness, or scaffolding.

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Section: Shared Emotionssupporting

confidence: 92%

Section: Joint Ownership Fusion and Token Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotional sharing and the extended mind

2017

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“…7 Cf. also Szanto 2015 and León, Szanto, Zahavi forthcoming; I have argued elsewhere for similar requirements for collective mentality (Szanto 2014) and collective intentionality (Szanto 2016b). some affective states of others.…”

Section: Emotional Sharing: the Guiding Questionsmentioning

confidence: 75%

“…See alsoSchmid's 'difference condition' (2009: 79).13 On such a concern-based account of SE in terms of what we care about as something that matters to us, see also Schmid forthcoming b. The most sustained (and convincing) different but still concernbased account of SE has recently been developed bySalmela & Nagatsu (2016a, 2016b.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Phenomenology of Shared Emotions—Reassessing Gerda Walther

Szanto

2018

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences

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“…Recall Zahavi's point presented in section 1 that a we‐experience cannot merely involve fusion or a “merged unity,” nor merely a “preserved plurality.” It must involve both plurality and integration (Szanto , 161). Or as Schmitz puts it, we‐mode groups are “neither mere sums of individuals, nor free‐floating or like additional people” (2017, 47).…”

Section: Common Knowledge and The We‐modementioning

confidence: 99%