The Phenomenology of Shared Emotions—Reassessing Gerda Walther

Szanto, Thomas

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-97861-1_7

Cited by 20 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…A much‐discussed example of shared grief can illustrate this idea (; cf. Stephan et al, ; Schmid, ; Zahavi, ; Krueger, ; Szanto, forthcoming‐a; León, Szanto and Zahavi, forthcoming). The phenomenologists Max Scheler asks us to imagine a father and a mother standing together beside the dead body of their child.…”

Section: Dimension Of Exementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the latter task, one might go beyond ExM and ExE debates and look into the growing body of work in social ontology and social cognition research. Here, we find resources to clarify the sense in which collective emotions involve a single, token‐identical phenomenal subject of those emotions, that is, some identification or fusion of emotional episodes of individuals—or, rather, the maintenance of a self/other‐differentiation (Huebner, ; Helm, , ; Salmela, , ; Schmid, ; Szanto, ; Zahavi, a, 2015b; Salmela & Nagatsu, ; Szanto, forthcoming‐a; Szanto, forthcoming‐b; León, Szanto, and Zahavi, forthcoming). Indeed, one of the central assumptions underlying skepticism regarding collective extensions of emotions is that either there is some ineffable phenomenal core to emotional experiences that is “non‐transferable” from one subject to another or else that they must fuse into one token‐identical emotional episode.…”

Section: Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Extended emotions

Krueger

Szanto

2016

Philosophy Compass

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Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain‐ and body‐bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis (ExE). In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences. First, we outline the background of the debate and discuss different argumentative strategies for ExE. In particular, we distinguish ExE from cognate but more moderate claims about the embodied and situated nature of cognition and emotion (Section 1). We then dwell upon two dimensions of ExE: emotions extended by material culture and by the social factors (Section 2). We conclude by defending ExE against some objections (Section 3) and point to desiderata for future research (Section 4).

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Section: Dimension Of Exementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extended emotions

Krueger

Szanto

2016

Philosophy Compass

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“…But if one admits such cases, one might also wonder how collective or shared emotions might play a role here and, furthermore, whether there might be not just interpersonal and group-level but genuinely collective forms of ER-biases. Though this is still contentious and depend on a number of further assumptions about the possibility of collective agency and emotions, there is already a large body of literature in philosophy that may path the way to move ahead in this direction (e.g., Schmid, 2009 ; List and Pettit, 2011 ; von Scheve and Salmela, 2014 ; Szanto, 2015 , 2016 , 2017 ; Tollefsen, 2015 ; León et al, under review). Above and beyond the need to properly analyze these cases in and for themselves, I believe that in order to get clear about the exact sense in which sociality is modulating the affective and rational life of individuals, future research should analyze this whole variety of cases.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation

Szanto

2017

Front. Psychol.

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The present paper proposes an integrative account of social forms of practical irrationality and corresponding disruptions of individual and group-level emotion regulation (ER). I will especially focus on disruptions in ER by means of collaborative agential and doxastic akrasia. I begin by distinguishing mutual, communal and collaborative forms of akrasia. Such a taxonomy seems all the more needed as, rather surprisingly, in the face of huge philosophical interest in analysing the possibility, structure, and mechanisms of individual practical irrationality, with very little exception, there are no comparable accounts of social and collaborative cases. However, I believe that, if it is true that individual akrasia is, in the long run, harmful for those who entertain it, this is even more so in social contexts. I will illustrate this point by drawing on various small group settings, and explore a number of socio-psychological mechanisms underlying collaborative irrationality, in particular groupthink. Specifically, I suggest that in collaborative cases there is what I call a spiraling of practical irrationality at play. I will argue that this is typically correlated and indeed partly due to biases in individual members’ affect control and eventually the group’s with whom the members identify.

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“…also Vendrell Ferran (2015), Svenaeus (2016Svenaeus ( , 2018. 3 Research on shared or collective emotions is still very recent, but constitutes an already burgeoning interdisciplinary field, including sociologists, social and developmental psychologists (cf., for an overview, von Scheve and Salmela 2014) and numerous philosophers (e.g., Gilbert 2002Gilbert , 2014Tollefsen 2006;Konzelmann Ziv 2007, 2009Helm 2008Helm , 2017Schmid 2009Schmid , 2014Huebner 2011;Michael 2011;Salmela 2012Salmela , 2014Nagatsu 2016a, 2016b;Krueger 2014Krueger , 2015Szanto 2015Szanto , 2018León et al (forthcoming); Thonhauser forthcoming; for recent review articles, see Schmid (2018) and Salmela (forthcoming). and in particular different display and vehicles of the expression of (shared) emotions, they argue that for structural and essential reasons our empathic grasp of the affective states of groups is more informative, "more extensive, exhaustive", and indeed "more adequate", than in the case of individuals (ibid., p. 166).…”

Section: Research Background and Future Avenuesmentioning

confidence: 99%