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2007
DOI: 10.1017/s1468109907002496
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How Junichiro Koizumi seized the leadership of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party

Abstract: In this paper, we examine some of the ways in which Koizumi Junichiro took advantage of changes in television news to win the 2001 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election and become prime minister of Japan. Koizumi adopted a strategy of political populism to increase his exposure in the media and develop a public reputation. Changes in the LDP selection procedure, in combination with long-term social and economic change and political reform, meant that the media mattered more to his campaign than … Show more

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Cited by 20 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Rather, taking the 1973 oil crisis as an example, he outlines a range of other power resources and channels of influence, including bilateral meetings with ministers and private secretaries' networks, that Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was able to use to influence the policymaking process. Others have highlighted the strengthening of the Prime Minister's Office (Shinoda 2007), the presidentialisation of Japanese politics (Krauss and Nyblade 2005), and the increasing importance of the media to enhance public image and approval (Kabashima and Steel 2007). So, once regarded as largely irrelevant, the prime minister is firmly back on the radar of observers of Japanese politics.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rather, taking the 1973 oil crisis as an example, he outlines a range of other power resources and channels of influence, including bilateral meetings with ministers and private secretaries' networks, that Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was able to use to influence the policymaking process. Others have highlighted the strengthening of the Prime Minister's Office (Shinoda 2007), the presidentialisation of Japanese politics (Krauss and Nyblade 2005), and the increasing importance of the media to enhance public image and approval (Kabashima and Steel 2007). So, once regarded as largely irrelevant, the prime minister is firmly back on the radar of observers of Japanese politics.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But the way he presented his policies in dramatic sound bites through the media was new ' (2007: 109). His right-hand secretary, Isao Iijima, also opened up the press conference to unconventional tabloid newspapers and soft news magazines, and he became a master of the daytime 'wide show' (daytime soft news) (Kabashima and Steel, 2007). We extend this argument by claiming that it was not only his media-savvy performance but also the strategic handling of the discourse that mobilized the massive popular support for his reforms.…”
Section: Research (1): the 2005 General Election -Koizumi's Discursivmentioning
confidence: 81%
“…Background For many voters and scholars (e.g., Kabashima and Steel, 2007;Otake, 2003;Reinem, 2005;Uchiyama, 2007), the appointment of Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi (2001Koizumi ( -2006) marked a new, empowered premiership that enjoyed unprecedented popular support, as seen in Figure 2. As Koizumi came from Yokosuka, an urban area facing Tokyo Bay, he was relatively free from the constraints posed by pork-barrel politics mainly rooted in rural constituencies.…”
Section: Research (1): the 2005 General Election -Koizumi's Discursivmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Koizumi exploited the new media to the fullest to maintain popularity and warm voters' hearts to win a third term—no mean feat in Japanese politics (cf. Kabashima & Steel, ). Abdullah and his administrative colleagues' unwarranted hostility against the new media, on the other hand, practically cost them the 12th GE—the slender majority providing ammunition to Abdullah's adversaries within UMNO.…”
Section: Historical Overview Of Umno and Ldpmentioning
confidence: 99%