Abstract:In this paper, we examine some of the ways in which Koizumi Junichiro took advantage of changes in television news to win the 2001 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election and become prime minister of Japan. Koizumi adopted a strategy of political populism to increase his exposure in the media and develop a public reputation. Changes in the LDP selection procedure, in combination with long-term social and economic change and political reform, meant that the media mattered more to his campaign than … Show more
“…Rather, taking the 1973 oil crisis as an example, he outlines a range of other power resources and channels of influence, including bilateral meetings with ministers and private secretaries' networks, that Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was able to use to influence the policymaking process. Others have highlighted the strengthening of the Prime Minister's Office (Shinoda 2007), the presidentialisation of Japanese politics (Krauss and Nyblade 2005), and the increasing importance of the media to enhance public image and approval (Kabashima and Steel 2007). So, once regarded as largely irrelevant, the prime minister is firmly back on the radar of observers of Japanese politics.…”
“…Rather, taking the 1973 oil crisis as an example, he outlines a range of other power resources and channels of influence, including bilateral meetings with ministers and private secretaries' networks, that Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was able to use to influence the policymaking process. Others have highlighted the strengthening of the Prime Minister's Office (Shinoda 2007), the presidentialisation of Japanese politics (Krauss and Nyblade 2005), and the increasing importance of the media to enhance public image and approval (Kabashima and Steel 2007). So, once regarded as largely irrelevant, the prime minister is firmly back on the radar of observers of Japanese politics.…”
“…But the way he presented his policies in dramatic sound bites through the media was new ' (2007: 109). His right-hand secretary, Isao Iijima, also opened up the press conference to unconventional tabloid newspapers and soft news magazines, and he became a master of the daytime 'wide show' (daytime soft news) (Kabashima and Steel, 2007). We extend this argument by claiming that it was not only his media-savvy performance but also the strategic handling of the discourse that mobilized the massive popular support for his reforms.…”
Section: Research (1): the 2005 General Election -Koizumi's Discursivmentioning
confidence: 81%
“…Background For many voters and scholars (e.g., Kabashima and Steel, 2007;Otake, 2003;Reinem, 2005;Uchiyama, 2007), the appointment of Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi (2001Koizumi ( -2006) marked a new, empowered premiership that enjoyed unprecedented popular support, as seen in Figure 2. As Koizumi came from Yokosuka, an urban area facing Tokyo Bay, he was relatively free from the constraints posed by pork-barrel politics mainly rooted in rural constituencies.…”
Section: Research (1): the 2005 General Election -Koizumi's Discursivmentioning
This article analyses the discourse of three prime ministers -Koizumi, Aso, and Hatoyama -to explore how each leader identified the political self and constructed and promoted a particular relationship with the voter before the general elections. The outcome indicates the emergence of a new political communication style based on a party-citizen relationship as business-consumer. Whereas Aso's patron-client discourse pinpoints the role of the responsible and bureaucratic state in protecting Japan, the business-consumer discourse of both Koizumi and Hatoyama demonstrates the entrepreneurial leaders' willingness to listen to individuals in order to meet their needs and expectations. We speculate that the social norms and values of the businessconsumer model might have played a role in attracting a large number of unorganized voters to Koizumi in 2005 and in turn to Hatoyama in 2009.
“…Koizumi exploited the new media to the fullest to maintain popularity and warm voters' hearts to win a third term—no mean feat in Japanese politics (cf. Kabashima & Steel, ). Abdullah and his administrative colleagues' unwarranted hostility against the new media, on the other hand, practically cost them the 12th GE—the slender majority providing ammunition to Abdullah's adversaries within UMNO.…”
Section: Historical Overview Of Umno and Ldpmentioning
This article argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is also stimulated by symbiotic ties binding together both countries' respective major political parties, i.e., the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003), derived political lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. First, emulation of Japan's success in economic development became the basis for the Look East Policy launched in 1981. Second, which is the focus of this article, lessons were drawn from the failure of LDP to retain power twice, in 1993 and in 2009. Although LDP's reversal of fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1993, the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogizing between different situations which at a glance seem to be comparable.
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