Hegel’s Idealist Reading of Spinoza

Newlands, Samuel

doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00378.x

Cited by 24 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…31 if Spinoza embraced radical monism, then all his talk of infinite attributes and modes would be, strictly speaking, false and many of his most cherished doctrines would be unintelligible from 31. i think this is a point that Della Rocca is actually happy to acknowledge (see, in particular, his (2012b). For a broader perspective see also Newlands (2011a;2011b). Della Rocca means to suggest, i believe, that the philosophically strongest strands in Spinoza's system point towards a radical monist solution, even if the bulk of his texts indicate that Spinoza himself took his system to be consistent with a rich plurality of modes and attributes.…”

Section: A Third Way Out: Radical Monismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

McDonough¹

2015

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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in a stimulating recent paper, "violations of the principle of Sufficient Reason (in leibniz and Spinoza)," Michael Della Rocca argues that rationalists face a daunting dilemma: either abandon the principle of Sufficient Reason or embrace a radical, parmenidian-style monism. The present paper argues that neither historical nor contemporary rationalists need be afraid of Della Rocca's dilemma. The second section reconstructs Della Rocca's argument in five steps. The third section argues that leibniz's treatment of relations undermines one of those steps in particular and thus provides him-as well as contemporary rationalists-with a way out. The fourth section argues that a similar way out is available to Spinoza, and that it's a better way out than either of the two options Della Rocca offers on Spinoza's behalf. The essay concludes with an historically-minded suggestion for those eager to revitalize the once-again popular notion of grounding.

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Section: A Third Way Out: Radical Monismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

McDonough¹

2015

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…Spinoza may want the One and the Many, but he ends up stuck with just the One, an empty unity that ‘swallows up’ all diversity and determinate content. (Newlands 2011: 106)…”

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‘Determination is negation’: The Adventures of a Doctrine from Spinoza to Hegel to the British Idealists

Stern¹

2016

Hegel Bulletin

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This paper is a discussion of Hegel's conception of the principle 'omnis determinatio est negatio', which he attributes to Spinoza. It is argued, however, that Spinoza understood this principle in a very different way from Hegel, which then sets up an interpretative puzzle: if this is so, why did he credit Spinoza with formulating it? This puzzle is resolved by paying attention to the context in which those attributions are made, while it is also shown that the British Idealists (unlike many contemporary commentators) were aware of the complexities in the Spinoza-Hegel relation on this issue. The paper also addresses some of the philosophical debates raised by this question, and the light it sheds on Hegel's critique of Spinoza as a monist.This paper concerns an interpretative puzzle, and also the philosophical lessons that can be learnt from it. The interpretative puzzle concerns Hegel's use of the slogan 'all determination is negation', where this idea forms an important part of Hegel's metaphysical thinking, and one that he is often said to have got from Spinoza, based not least on comments Hegel himself makes. But in fact, the way in which Hegel understands the doctrine seems to be the opposite of the way in which Spinoza understood it: roughly, for Hegel the negation that comes with determination is necessary for being in any genuine sense, whereas for Spinoza the negation that comes with determination is a privation of being, a way of not being -so while for Hegel such determination through negation is a necessary condition if being is not to collapse into nothing, for Spinoza it is a taking away of being. How, then, did this inversion come about; why didn't Hegel make it clearer; and why has it been so frequently missed? And, philosophically speaking, what hangs on it, and what role does it play in Hegel's critique of Spinoza?In this paper, I want to examine what this difference between the Hegelian and Spinozistic ways of taking the doctrine amounts to, and how it is to be explained. I also want to explore the impact this difference had on the British Idealists. I will argue that several of the British Idealists (unlike several contemporary Hegel commentators) clearly saw the contrast between Spinoza and Hegel here, where some

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“…Of course, Spinoza's German and British Idealist readers will contest Spinoza's right to the claim that a multiplicity of distinct particulars exists, insofar as in their view he never adequately demonstrates the necessity of distinct modes (see e.g. (Hegel, )); for discussion see (Melamed, ); (Newlands, ); (Hübner, ).…”

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Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason

Hübner

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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The article proposes a new solution to the long-standing problem of the universality of essences in Spinoza's ontology. It argues that, according to Spinoza, particular things in nature possess unique essences, but that these essences coexist with more general, mind-dependent species-essences, constructed by finite minds on the basis of similarities ('agreements') that obtain among the properties of formally-real particulars. This account provides the best fit both with the textual evidence and with Spinoza's other metaphysical and epistemological commitments. The article offers new readings of how Spinoza understands not just the nature of essence, but also the nature of being, reason, striving, definitions, and different kinds of knowledge.

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Hegel’s Idealist Reading of Spinoza

Cited by 24 publications

References 4 publications

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

‘Determination is negation’: The Adventures of a Doctrine from Spinoza to Hegel to the British Idealists

Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason

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