‘Determination is negation’: The Adventures of a Doctrine from Spinoza to Hegel to the British Idealists

Abstract

This paper is a discussion of Hegel's conception of the principle 'omnis determinatio est negatio', which he attributes to Spinoza. It is argued, however, that Spinoza understood this principle in a very different way from Hegel, which then sets up an interpretative puzzle: if this is so, why did he credit Spinoza with formulating it? This puzzle is resolved by paying attention to the context in which those attributions are made, while it is also shown that the British Idealists (unlike many contemporary commentators) were aware of the complexities in the Spinoza-Hegel relation on this issue. The paper also addresses some of the philosophical debates raised by this question, and the light it sheds on Hegel's critique of Spinoza as a monist.This paper concerns an interpretative puzzle, and also the philosophical lessons that can be learnt from it. The interpretative puzzle concerns Hegel's use of the slogan 'all determination is negation', where this idea forms an important part of Hegel's metaphysical thinking, and one that he is often said to have got from Spinoza, based not least on comments Hegel himself makes. But in fact, the way in which Hegel understands the doctrine seems to be the opposite of the way in which Spinoza understood it: roughly, for Hegel the negation that comes with determination is necessary for being in any genuine sense, whereas for Spinoza the negation that comes with determination is a privation of being, a way of not being -so while for Hegel such determination through negation is a necessary condition if being is not to collapse into nothing, for Spinoza it is a taking away of being. How, then, did this inversion come about; why didn't Hegel make it clearer; and why has it been so frequently missed? And, philosophically speaking, what hangs on it, and what role does it play in Hegel's critique of Spinoza?In this paper, I want to examine what this difference between the Hegelian and Spinozistic ways of taking the doctrine amounts to, and how it is to be explained. I also want to explore the impact this difference had on the British Idealists. I will argue that several of the British Idealists (unlike several contemporary Hegel commentators) clearly saw the contrast between Spinoza and Hegel here, where some

Hegel's Ontological Argument: A Reconstruction

“… 20 The version of the ‘omnis determinatio’ argument I emphasize here is the one Stern (2016) calls ‘Spinozist’ and, at least initially, distinguishes from Hegel's own. However, Stern ultimately ends up arguing that the doctrine which Hegel seems to put forward in his own voice is usually Spinoza's own in disguise: ‘the context of Hegel's reference to the ‘determination is negation’ principle suggests that he was using it in a way similar to Spinoza—which then of course dispels the mystery that he should refer to Spinoza at just this point, notwithstanding his different take on the principle when it is used elsewhere’ (2016: 38). Stern's interpretation is thus completely consistent with mine on this point.…”

O problema da substância na Doutrina da Essência (1813) de Hegel

“…A objeção fundamental de Hegel é que a filosofia de Spinoza é um "pensar externo" (Hegel 2017, p. 200) A exposição do sistema de Spinoza no primeiro capítulo da seção sobre a efetividade provocou e continua a provocar uma discussão intensa sobre se Hegel teria simplesmente equivocado Spinoza (Melamed, 2012), incorporando inadvertidamente uma lógica da pura afirmação a uma lógica da negatividade estranha ao filósofo holandês (Macherey, 1979, pp.135-36, 179), ou se ele, primeiro, teria compreendido a especificidade da posição de Spinoza sobre a negação (a negação como privação de ser pertencente exclusivamente às coisas finitas enquanto finitas), enunciada na famosa carta a Jarig Jelles de 1674 (Carta 50), e, então, teria tomado conscientemente distância de Spinoza, elaborando uma compreensão inovadora da negatividade como processo de autodiferenciação da substância. No meu ver, o debate recente sobre a compreensão da proposição omnis determinatio est negatio mostra que é oportuno ler a posição hegeliana como oposta àquela espinosana, sem disso tirar a conclusão de que Hegel estava cego diante dessa diferença (Stern, 2016). Ao mesmo tempo, a oposição entre Spinoza e Hegel mostra, por um lado, que a pretensão de Hegel de ler na proposição espinosana um início embrionário de sua lógica da negatividade absoluta precisa ser reduzida à expressão de um mero desejo, e, por outro lado, que a necessidade de explicar as diferenças do real, a partir da diferença real entre os atributos, reintroduz o problema da negatividade, que uma lógica da pura afirmação supostamente queria deixar de fora ou reduzir a um âmbito meramente proposicional (Cirulli, 2006, pp.129-130).…”

In the spirit of Hegel?

“… Cf. Stern (2009: 67-76).3 SeeStern (2016a).4 Though Brandom is not discussing it in this context, as his focus is on conceptual norms, I have argued elsewhere that this is a mistake in relation to Kant's view of moral norms and thus the moral law: seeStern (2012: 7-40).…”