Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason

Abstract

The article proposes a new solution to the long-standing problem of the universality of essences in Spinoza's ontology. It argues that, according to Spinoza, particular things in nature possess unique essences, but that these essences coexist with more general, mind-dependent species-essences, constructed by finite minds on the basis of similarities ('agreements') that obtain among the properties of formally-real particulars. This account provides the best fit both with the textual evidence and with Spinoza's other metaphysical and epistemological commitments. The article offers new readings of how Spinoza understands not just the nature of essence, but also the nature of being, reason, striving, definitions, and different kinds of knowledge.

Introduction

“…3 See e.g. Della Rocca 2008;Garrett 2009;Viljanen 2011;Alanen 2012;Marshall 2013;Hübner 2016, 2017 2015 is a particularly notable example of the heightened interest in Spinoza's early works.…”

Spinoza on Composition, Monism, and Beings of Reason

“…29 For a great discussion on extension and divisibility that makes a convincing case for this interpretive point, seePeterman (2015).30 This tendency is especially notable in his treatment of universals. On universals and beings of reason, see, e.g.,Hübner (2015Hübner ( , 2016,and Newlands (2015and Newlands ( , 2017. 31 Perhaps this is most apparent in Spinoza's discussion of moral terms.…”

Spinoza on the Limits of Explanation

“…I distinguish here ideas that essentially constitute a human mind (i.e. constitute the essence of that mind) from sensory and other ideas acquires in the course of existence, and which come to co-constitute human minds.17 On why Spinoza is entitled to adequate concepts of kinds, seeHübner (2015bHübner ( ), (2021.18 Cf Jarrett (1982…”