This paper concerns the relationship between the mental (ideas, minds, and the attribute of thought) and the conceptual (concepts, conceiving, and conceptual dependence) in Spinoza. I argue against the natural and pervasive assumption that Spinoza's appeals to the conceptual are synonymous with appeals to the mental. I show instead that conceptual relations are attribute-neutral for Spinoza; mental relations comprise a proper subset of conceptual relations. This surprising conclusion, that the conceptual outstrips the mental, also sheds new light on the relationship between the attributes, the extent of parallelism, and the nature of extension. It also shows how Spinoza's frequent privileging of the conceptual avoids collapsing into idealism.
Leibniz’s views on modality are among the most discussed by his interpreters. Although most of the discussion has focused on Leibniz’s analyses of modality, this essay explores Leibniz’s grounding of modality. Leibniz holds that possibilities and possibilia are grounded in the intellect of God. Although other early moderns agreed that modal truths are in some way dependent on God, there were sharp disagreements surrounding two distinct questions: (1) On what in God do modal truths and modal truth-makers depend? (2) What is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths and modal truth-makers depend on God? Very roughly, Leibniz’s own answers are: (1) God’s intellect and (2) a form of ontological dependence. The essay first distinguishes Leibniz’s account from two nearby (and often misunderstood) alternatives found in Descartes and Spinoza. It then examines Leibniz’s theory in detail, showing how, on his account, God’s ideas provide both truth-makers for possibilities and necessities and an ontological foothold for those truth-makers, thereby explaining modal truths. Along the way, it suggests several refinements and possible amendments to Leibniz’s grounding thesis. It then defends Leibniz against a pair of recent objections by Robert Merrihew Adams and Andrew Chignell that invoke the early work of Kant. I conclude that whereas Leibniz’s alternative avoids collapsing into yet another form of Spinozism, the alternatives proposed by Adams, Chignell, and the early Kant do not.
In this paper, I discuss Hegel’s influential reading of Spinoza as a kind of idealist. I begin with a brief overview of Spinoza’s doctrines of substance, mode, and attributes. I then turn to Hegel’s arguments that Spinoza is an acosmicist (someone who denies the existence of finite individuals) and that Spinoza’s attribute of thought becomes the sole fundamental attribute. Underlying both criticisms is Hegel’s charge that Spinoza cannot consistently affirm his doctrine of substance and his doctrines of attribute and mode pluralism. In conclusion, I discuss the legacy of Hegel’s idealist reading.
In this paper, I discuss a once dominant tradition of Spinoza interpretation that shows signs of renewal: Spinoza as a kind of idealist. According to this interpretation, the attribute of thought is the most fundamental attribute in Spinoza’s system and the existence of finite modes is in some way illusory. Its proponents include a contemporary scholar, Michael Della Rocca, as well as several late 19th century British scholars: John Caird, Harold Joachim, James Martineau, and Frederick Pollock. In this paper, I explore their arguments, criticisms, and conclusions.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.