The Harmony of Spinoza and Leibniz

Newlands, Samuel

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00354.x

Cited by 25 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Still, I take it that the two notions of per se and relative possibility are very much in the same ballpark. Newlands () argues that a similar notion can also be found in Spinoza.…”

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confidence: 72%

Metaphysical Rationalism

Dasgupta

2014

Nous

151

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The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a "grounding" explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a "rationalist" metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are "metaphysically brute" and that the world could in so many ways have been different.Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion-think that trees might talk just as well as men-that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed . . .-B. Spinoza, Ethics, 1p8s2A metaphysical rationalist is someone who endorses the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), the principle that everything has an explanation. The PSR can be understood in a number of different ways depending on the meaning of 'explanation' and the range of the quantifier 'everything', so metaphysical rationalists come in many different stripes. But every rationalist thinks that in some interesting sense there is an explanation (or "reason") for everything. Her rationalism is then qualified as being metaphysical to distinguish it from other rationalisms (such as epistemic rationalism, a thesis concerning the sources of justification) but this qualification can now be dropped for brevity.Although rationalism of one form or another was arguably embraced by such luminaries as Aquinas, Spinoza, and Leibniz (amongst others), it is fair to say that it has since largely fallen out of favor. Indeed my sense is that (with a few exceptions) contemporary philosophers tend to treat it as an antiquated view that need not be taken seriously today. 1 This may be the result of two factors. First, the PSR (in one form or another) is often thought to have consequences that might be thought problematic, including necessitarianism (the view that every truth is necessarily true), the existence of God, and indeed the existence of every conceivable being. 2 And second, there is a perceived lack of evidence in its favor. These two factors naturally lead to an attitude of (perhaps respectful) dismissal. C 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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“…Still, I take it that the two notions of per se and relative possibility are very much in the same ballpark. Newlands () argues that a similar notion can also be found in Spinoza.…”

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confidence: 72%

Metaphysical Rationalism

Dasgupta

2014

Nous

151

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“…It is arguably the most common explanation of the principle. 29 Newlands (2010) explains the proposed derivation well:…”

Section: Two Potential Bases Of the Principlementioning

confidence: 87%

Spinoza and the problem of other substances

Barry

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Most of Spinoza’s arguments for God’s existence do not rely on any special feature of God, but instead on merely general features of substance. This raises the following worry: those arguments prove the existence of non-divine substances just as much as they prove God’s existence, and yet there is not enough room in Spinoza’s system for all these substances. I argue that Spinoza attempts to solve this problem by using a principle of plenitude to rule out the existence of other substances and that the principle cannot be derived from the PSR, as many claim.Abbreviation: PSR: Principle of Sufficient Reason

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“…But this elucidation cannot be a genuine, non-circular analysis if, as I have argued elsewhere, modal relations are themselves to be analyzed in terms of conceptual dependence for Spinoza. 46 The closest Spinoza comes to offering directly a more illuminating account of conceptual dependence is buried deep in his commentary on Descartes: "For the concept which we have of our thought does not involve, or contain [non involvit, sive non continet] the necessary existence of the thought" (C 245; G I/157). Here, conceptual independence is glossed as a kind of containment relation, an account Spinoza also embraces in the Ethics (see section 3.3 above).…”

Section: Conceptual Dependencementioning

confidence: 99%

Another Kind of Spinozistic Monism

Newlands

2010

Noûs

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Introduction -Raising the questionThe momentous opening pages of Spinoza's Ethics are well known for his efforts to prove a remarkable thesis: there is only one possible substance and it necessarily exists. But concurrent with his drive towards substance monism is another equally striking but more easily overlooked monistic project. This project concerns the relations between various kinds of metaphysical dependence. What, according to Spinoza, are the relationships between causation, inherence, conceptual connectedness, following-from, and existential dependence? My proposed answer is that Spinoza thinks all metaphysical dependence relations are conceptual containment relations, a single kind of dependence that Spinoza labels "conceptual involvement." I call Spinoza's thesis that every relation of metaphysical dependence just is a relation of conceptual dependence the thesis of conceptual dependence monism.Although the topic of dependence relations in Spinoza may have the air of hyper-specialized historical arcana, understanding Spinoza's conceptual dependence monism yields important insights into many of his most striking and pervasive metaphysical views, including the intensionality of causal contexts, the nature and relations of substance and modes, necessitarianism, the demands of metaphysical perfection, and the content of his explanatory rationalism. It also provides us with a neglected step in Spinoza's proof for his more famous substance monism, one that prevents the whole proof from otherwise begging the question against substance pluralists like Leibniz. And whereas Spinoza's substance monism may appear to be an historically interesting, but philosophically untenable project 1 , Spinoza's interest in the relationship between various kinds of metaphysical dependence mirrors a vibrant research project in contemporary metaphysics. C 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 469

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The Harmony of Spinoza and Leibniz

Cited by 25 publications

References 27 publications

Metaphysical Rationalism

Metaphysical Rationalism

Spinoza and the problem of other substances

Another Kind of Spinozistic Monism

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