Abstract:The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a "grounding" explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is … Show more
“…Schaffer []); Leibniz, []’s principle of sufficient reason required every truth to have an explanation with none being ungrounded (cf. Della Rocca []; Dasgupta []); and Bolzano [] anticipated recent interest in ground in developing a formal framework for it (cf. Tatzel []).…”
This essay focuses on a recently prominent notion of (metaphysical) ground which is distinctive for how it links metaphysics to explanation. Ground is supposed to serve both as the common factor in diverse in virtue of questions as well as the structuring relation in the project of explaining how some phenomena are “built” from more fundamental phenomena. My aim is to provide an opinionated synopsis of this notion of ground without engaging with others. Ground, so understood, generally resists illumination by appeal to more familiar models of explanation. Nevertheless, its distinctive explanatory and metaphysical aspects guide us on characterizing its explanatory logic and its metaphysical features. Some issues concerning the meta‐question of what (if anything) grounds ground are explored, as well as some recent skeptical challenges to ground.
“…Schaffer []); Leibniz, []’s principle of sufficient reason required every truth to have an explanation with none being ungrounded (cf. Della Rocca []; Dasgupta []); and Bolzano [] anticipated recent interest in ground in developing a formal framework for it (cf. Tatzel []).…”
This essay focuses on a recently prominent notion of (metaphysical) ground which is distinctive for how it links metaphysics to explanation. Ground is supposed to serve both as the common factor in diverse in virtue of questions as well as the structuring relation in the project of explaining how some phenomena are “built” from more fundamental phenomena. My aim is to provide an opinionated synopsis of this notion of ground without engaging with others. Ground, so understood, generally resists illumination by appeal to more familiar models of explanation. Nevertheless, its distinctive explanatory and metaphysical aspects guide us on characterizing its explanatory logic and its metaphysical features. Some issues concerning the meta‐question of what (if anything) grounds ground are explored, as well as some recent skeptical challenges to ground.
“…“Say that a fact is fundamental (or brute) iff it does not obtain in virtue of other facts” (Rosen , 126).“The fundamental (or brute) truths (if such there be) give us the ultimate foundation for the whole of reality” (Cameron , 115).“Fundamental or ‘brute’ facts must be facts within physics” (Árnadóttir and Crane , 252).“There are those facts that are apt for having a ground but lack one. These are the so‐called ‘fundamental’ or ‘brute' facts” (Dasgupta , 387).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consider for example the following. “I take grounding to be metaphysical explanation : to say that ϕ grounds ψ is to say that ϕ provides a metaphysical explanation of ψ ” (Litland , 20).“Some truths metaphysically explain, or ground, another truth just in case the laws of metaphysics determine the latter truth on the basis of the former” (Wilsch , 1).“This attitude may be justified when it comes to some versions of the PSR ... One way that this version differs from others is that it is concerned with one particular mode of explanation, what is nowadays referred to as metaphysical or grounding explanation” (Dasgupta , 380).All these statements present ‘grounding explanation’ as basically interchangeable with ‘metaphysical explanation’. Thus if the fundamental is by definition that which is ungrounded, and if grounding is the relation of explanation relevant to metaphysics, then – as far as metaphysics is concerned at least – the fundamental is that which cannot be explained .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, everyone is happy with the idea that there are facts about the fundamental level that are open to causal explanation – such as why two electrons just collided where they did (cf. Dasgupta , 383) – so that the sort of explanation relevant to brutalism clearly must be restricted to distinctively metaphysical forms if it is to be tenable. The fundamental openness to scientific explanation thus does nothing to undermine the doctrine, and equally assuages any worries about burdening scientists with any conceptual incoherence.…”
In metaphysics, the fundamental is standardly equated with that which has no explanation – with that which is, in other words, ‘brute’. But this doctrine of brutalism is in tension with physicists’ ambitions to not only describe but also explain why the fundamental is the way that it is. The tension would ease were science taken to be incapable of furnishing the sort of explanations that brutalists are concerned with, given that these are understood to be of a distinctively ‘metaphysical sort’. But to assume this is to assume a sharp demarcation between physics and metaphysics that surely cannot be taken for granted. This paper sets out to examine the standing of brutalism from the perspective of contemporary fundamental physics, together with theories of explanation drawn both from the philosophy of science and metaphysics. Focusing on what fundamental kinds the world instantiates and how physicists go about determining them, I argue that a partial explanation, in Hempel's sense, may be given of this fundamental feature. Moreover, since this partial explanation issues, at least in part, from stipulations as to the essential nature of the kinds involved, I claim that it has as much right to be regarded as a metaphysical explanation as do grounding explanations. As such, my conclusion will be that the doctrine of brutalism can no longer be regardedas tenable: at least modulo certain plausible essentialist assumptions, it is no longer the case that no explanation can be given of the fundamental.
“…How is grounding related to explanation Dasgupta (, ) and Litland () hold that (metaphysical) grounding just is metaphysical explanation whereas Schaffer (, ) and Audi () hold that grounding “backs” or “underwrites” this distinctive sort of explanation. Both views are compatible with pluralism.…”
Fine () is a pluralist about grounding. He holds that there are three fundamentally distinct notions of grounding: metaphysical, normative, and natural. Berker () argues for monism on the grounds that the pluralist cannot account for certain principles describing how the distinct notions of grounding interact. This paper defends pluralism. By building on work by Fine () and Litland () I show how the pluralist can systematically account for Berker's interaction principles.
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