2018
DOI: 10.1002/tht3.273
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In Defense of the (Moderate) Disunity of Grounding

Abstract: Fine () is a pluralist about grounding. He holds that there are three fundamentally distinct notions of grounding: metaphysical, normative, and natural. Berker () argues for monism on the grounds that the pluralist cannot account for certain principles describing how the distinct notions of grounding interact. This paper defends pluralism. By building on work by Fine () and Litland () I show how the pluralist can systematically account for Berker's interaction principles.

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Cited by 10 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…41 I am setting aside the issue of whether there are non-metaphysical notions of ground like "natural" and "normative" ground. For discussion see Fine (2012), Berker (2018), andLitland (2018a). 42 This statement of the essentialist idea simplifies Fine (2012, p. 75); related ideas are explored in Rosen (2010, pp.…”
Section: Conceptual and Metaphysical Groundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…41 I am setting aside the issue of whether there are non-metaphysical notions of ground like "natural" and "normative" ground. For discussion see Fine (2012), Berker (2018), andLitland (2018a). 42 This statement of the essentialist idea simplifies Fine (2012, p. 75); related ideas are explored in Rosen (2010, pp.…”
Section: Conceptual and Metaphysical Groundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That the link of a grounding explanation has this form is not uncontroversial. For example, Litland (2018b) can be understood as claiming that links are arguments or inferences, and Schaffer (2017a) conceives of links as metaphysical laws, modeled as a structural equation. In what follows, I will assume pace Litland that links are propositions or facts (rather than arguments or inferens), but I allow that links can have the form of laws, cf.…”
Section: Preliminariesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…argues that metaphysical grounding isn't transitive. For replies, see, e.g.,Litland (2013;,Krämer and Roski (2017), and Wygoda Cohen (2020).14 Critical discussions of the allegedly close connection between grounding and explanation includeKovacs (2017) andMaurin (2019).15 Parallel transmission arguments for (E3) can be generated by substituting grounding with certain other metaphysical determination relations in (G1)-(G4).16 Compare Lange (2018) on mixed transitivity, as well asLitland (2018). Securing such an entailment might require modifying the Grounding-Explanation Link in (G3) in some appropriate way.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%