Hedging in the Middle East and China‐U.S. Competition¹

Abstract

This article examines policies of both China and the United States in the Middle East. It evaluates the effectiveness of Beijing's strategic hedging behavior against Washington's “hard power” strategies by discussing several policy challenges in this region: energy security, the Iranian nuclear issue, terrorism, regional alliance structures, and the “Arab Spring.” The results of this study show that the gradual retreat of the United States from the Middle East coincides with a stronger Chinese presence in the region on several fronts. In examining Sino‐U.S. power competition in the Middle East, it contributes to the advancement of “strategic hedging” as a still underdeveloped concept in the International Relations literature.

Strategic Hedging and Unipolarity's Demise: The Case of China's Strategic Hedging

“…Soft balancing depends on nonmilitary measures, including economic, diplomatic, and institutional means, to delay, frustrate, and undermine a stronger actor (Salman et al, ). Several examples have confirmed this approach by second‐tier states, such as the opposition to U.S. intervention in Kosovo 1999 and the opposition to the Iraqi war in 2003 (Paul, ).…”

“…Second, soft balancing behavior is not designed to constrain the system leader in military terms, so it does not pave the way for future hard balancing actions (Brooks & Wohlforth, ). Third, “soft balancing cannot account for shifts in the balance of power, especially in military terms” (Salman et al, , p. 577). In response to these shortcomings, strategic hedging has emerged as a new concept in the International Relations field to add an important element to the long history of “balances of powers.” Strategic hedging attempts to build on the old structural approach of “balance of power” theory and offers a new insight to explain how second‐tier states seek to improve their competitiveness within a unipolar system (Tessman & Wolfe, ).…”

“…They found that while China uses strategic hedging to improve its relative position vis‐à‐vis the United States, it also plays an important role in the Sino‐Middle East relations (Salman & Geeraerts, 2015). Salman et al () have also employed “strategic hedging concept” to shed light on an aspect of competitive relationship between great powers from a structural point of view. They have sought to compare the effects of perceived hard power strategies and the effects of strategic hedging behavior as a new approach in international relations (Salman et al, ).…”

“…Salman et al () have also employed “strategic hedging concept” to shed light on an aspect of competitive relationship between great powers from a structural point of view. They have sought to compare the effects of perceived hard power strategies and the effects of strategic hedging behavior as a new approach in international relations (Salman et al, ). Another study has attempted to measure the core components of a state's strategic hedging capability by means of a composite index (Geeraerts & Salman, ).…”

“…Strategic hedging is simultaneously “less confrontational than traditional balancing, less cooperative than bandwagoning, and more proactive than buck‐passing” (Tessman, , p. 193). Such a strategy is different from hard balancing in that it refers to behavior that explicitly avoids direct confrontation with the system leader; it is also distinct from soft balancing as it prepares the hedging state for possible confrontations with the system leader (see Salman et al, ; Tessman, ). For these reasons, it is more likely to be the core strategy for second‐tier states under the structure of a deconcentrating unipolar system.…”