This paper analyses the extent to which Kazakhstan’s agency in its interaction with China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative is shaped not only by Russia and China’s outward projection, but also de-centring practices at the regional and sub-national level. The Kazakhstani government has embraced China’s Silk Road economic belt (SREB—the land-based ‘belt’ of the BRI) and has aligned its ‘Nurly Zhol’ domestic stimulus programme with the SREB. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union increases Russian leverage over Kazakhstani trade and tariff policies. The advent of the BRI thus exacerbates, but has not caused, a partially competing logic behind Russia’s defensive regionalism and Kazakhstan’s professed multi-vector foreign policy. Contrasting the latter with Russian and Chinese geopolitical constraints imposed on the sociopolitical fabric of Kazakhstan, the paper examines how Kazakhstan is a microcosm for the dynamics of a new Eurasian order in the making.

This paper argues that the instrumental reference to Russian 'compatriots' in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 served as a discursive framing to justify contradictions in Russian approaches to state sovereignty to an international audience. Contrary to teleological readings of Russian foreign policy, however, the paper argues that while Russian diaspora policies have been tapped into, the iterative and partially contradictory development thereof on a governmental level suggests that these were not the blueprint for a revisionist foreign policy by design. It contextualizes the evolution of Russian diaspora policies against the background of the evolution of the wider 'Russian World' conception and shows how the discourse about the protection of 'compatriots' was contextual and has translated into geopolitical boundary-making at a time when relations between Russia and the West deteriorated.

This article examines policies of both China and the United States in the Middle East. It evaluates the effectiveness of Beijing's strategic hedging behavior against Washington's “hard power” strategies by discussing several policy challenges in this region: energy security, the Iranian nuclear issue, terrorism, regional alliance structures, and the “Arab Spring.” The results of this study show that the gradual retreat of the United States from the Middle East coincides with a stronger Chinese presence in the region on several fronts. In examining Sino‐U.S. power competition in the Middle East, it contributes to the advancement of “strategic hedging” as a still underdeveloped concept in the International Relations literature.

Taking Syria's armed conflict as a case study to illustrate processes of normative contestation in international relations, this paper is interested in reexamining the typology of Russia as a 'rising power' to account for 'rise' in a non-material dimension. The article embeds the 'rising power' label in the literature on international norm dynamics to reflect on the rationale for Russia's engagement in Syria despite adverse material preconditions. It will be argued that Russian norm divergence from alleged 'Western' norms illustrates the ambition to co-define conditions for legitimate transgressions of state sovereignty.