Government Formation and Cabinets

Abstract

The government in a parliamentary (or semi-presidential) democracy refers to the prime minister and the other cabinet ministers, whereas the government in a presidential democracy refers to the president's cabinet. The members of the government cabinet determine national policy and arguably hold the most important political positions in their country. Most governments comprise two or more parties, which means that the government formation process requires coalition-building. During this process, party elites bargain over who gets which ministerial position and over policy; they can reach an agreement quickly and take office, or the bargaining can break down and take months to resolve. This essay discusses the different types of governments that can form as well as how they form in parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential regimes. Recent research on government formation and cabinets has introduced new theoretical arguments, and the implications of these arguments are being tested with new data and new statistical methods. For example, analyses of European democracies now include the post-communist Eastern countries (not only the Western ones), and more scholars are studying coalition governments in Latin America. Future research might include more work on cabinets in developing democracies in regions such as Africa and Asia, as well as analyses of the political and economic consequences of bargaining delays and the partisan composition of the government.

Question of Timing: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Multiparty Presidential Regimes

“…As such, the cabinet must be formed by the day the president assumes office. This is quite different from the procedure found in parliamentary regimes, where, broadly speaking, the bargaining rounds for government formation begin after the election and are (theoretically) unlimited (CHEIBUB et al, 2015;GOLDER 2015GOLDER , 2010. As an unintended consequence of this trait, the absence of a temporal bound in government formation under parliamentarism contributes to blurring the lines between clear 'winners' and hinders the responsiveness of 'unexpected' coalitions 3…”

When do coalitions form under presidentialism, and why does it matter? A configurational analysis from Latin America

“…The process of cabinet formation under a presidential system must usually conclude in the period between the proclamation of the result of the election and the president assuming office, a period that is generally fixed by the constitution. This is quite different from what occurs in parliamentary regimes, where, broadly speaking, the bargaining rounds for coalition formation begin after the election and are (theoretically) unlimited in length (Golder, 2015). This feature blurs the lines between clear 'winners' and hinders the responsiveness of 'unexpected' coalitions 1 (Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason, 2013;Glasgow et al, 2011).…”

“…First, the coalition needs to win the election. Hence, coalition cabinets based on pre-electoral agreements are expected to be more homogeneous ideologically, more consistent, cohesive, and, by extension, more stable (Chiru, 2015; Debus, 2009; Golder, 2015). Even if ideological proximity can save ‘rounds of formation’, however, it has no automatic effect on the issues of the agreement (Bäck et al, 2009; Golder, 2010).…”

Flying solo: Explaining single‐party cabinets under minority presidentialism

“…All of these findings are robust to the inclusion of regional controls. As Golder (2015) notes, the government formation process works differently in parliamentary and presidential regimes: in the latter, 'the president is the formateur and the president's party is always represented in the cabinet' (Golder 2015: 7). In this article, we are unconcerned with the reasons why the formateur starts from a minority position.…”