Flying solo: Explaining single‐party cabinets under minority presidentialism

Abstract

In recent years, the comparative literature on presidential democracy has emphasised the role of coalitional politics in attenuating the ‘perils’ facing minority presidents. Yet since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratisation in 1974, a surprising number of minority presidents have eschewed cabinet coalitions (defined minimally as the awarding of at least one portfolio to a party other than the nominal party of the president). Unipartisan governments are observed just under half of the time. What explains the adoption of single‐party cabinets by minority presidents? Cross‐sectional time‐series analysis is employed to address this question. Hypotheses are tested that relate to the size and distribution of the formateur (presidential) and largest non‐formateur parties that make up the legislature; the nature of party linkages and ideological distance between the president and possible partisan allies; and the extent of reactive veto powers held by the president.

How Do Minority Presidents Manage Multiparty Coalitions? Identifying and Analyzing the Payoffs to Coalition Parties in Presidential Systems

“…These costs mean that minority presidents do not automatically seek the benefits that multiparty cabinets offer. Hence, a surprisingly high percentage of minority presidents (48%) governed with single- or no-party governments in political systems that met minimum democratic standards over the period 1974–2013 (Chaisty and Power 2016).…”

“…Although minority presidents (unlike minority prime ministers in parliamentary systems) do not face the threat of losing votes of confidence, they still deploy coalitional strategies. Between 1974 and 2013, 52 percent of minority presidents governing in political systems that met minimum democratic standards formed cabinets from more than one party (Chaisty and Power 2016).…”

The Presidential Party: A Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis

“…The president can be the chief of the parliamentary majority, or more accurately, of its biggest party in the case of a coalition. Conversely, he or she can be the chief of the party (the biggest opposition party or the biggest party) who did not elect him or her, the minority party of the coalition, thus producing a case of a divided government or cohabitation (Chaisty and Power, 2019; Elgie, 2001).…”

Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism: patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies

“…demanding rules for veto override), the more likely are minority cabinets (e.g. Chaisty and Power 2016;Cheibub-Figueiredo, Canello, and Vieira 2012). The president can use the veto to protect the government's agenda and block unwanted legislation.…”