How are policy processes affected by the fact that representatives of particular interests formally take part in public decision-making? This has been the central question in neocorporatist theory for several years. It is sometimes argued that corporatist does promote trust, public deliberation, and even the public interest. However, despite the theoretical focus on different modes of interest intermediation, how the causal mechanisms within corporatist arrangements actually work has been assumed, not empirically demonstrated. As Jane Mansbridge (1992b, 45) has pointed out (referring especially to Streeck and Schmitter), "Given this nuanced description of the processes of identity change that accompany group deliberation, it is puzzling that the empirical work does not address either the presence or absence of these processes." In order to address that deficiency, this article presents empirical evidence on how a corporatist organization of politics affects trust and deliberation in state activities, using Swedish public administration as a case.