Corporatism may be seen as variety of capitalism in which specific structural prerequisites such as unionization, centralization, and strong states combined with bargaining and concertation produce certain economic outputs. Corporatism may also be seen as a variety of democracy in which interest groups are integrated in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies. Departing in the last position, we measure the strength of Scandinavian corporatism by the involvement of interest groups in public committees, councils, and commissions. Corporatism in relation to the preparation of policy has gone down in all three Scandinavian countries whereas corporatism in implementation processes are more varied among the three countries.Résumé Le corporatisme peut être envisagé comme une forme de capitalisme, dans lequel des conditions préalables structurelles spécifiques, comme le syndicalisme, la centralisation, et des Etats forts, associés à la négociation et à la concertation produisent certains résultats économiques. Le corporatisme peut également être vu comme une forme de de´mocratie, dans laquelle des groupes d'intérêts forment un ensemble cohérent pour la préparation et la mise en oeuvre des politiques publiques. Partant de cette dernière considération, nous mesurons la force du corporatisme existant en Scandinavie, par l'engagement des groupes d'intérêt dans les comités publiques, les conseils et les commissions. Le corporatisme dans le cadre de la pré-paration des politiques a été retenu dans les trois pays scandinaves, tandis que les procédés de mise du corporatisme recouvrent une variété plus étendue dans ces trois pays.Zusammenfassung Korporatismus könnte als eine Form des Kapitalismus angesehen werden, in der bestimmte strukturelle Vorraussetzungen wie gewerkschaftliche Organisierung, Zentralisierung und ein starker Staat kombiniert mit Tarifverhandlungen and Konzertierung bestimmte ökonomische Ergebnisse bewirken. Korporatismus könnte auch als eine Form von Demokratie angesehen werden, in der Interessengruppen in die Vorbereitung und/oder Implementierung von politischen Maßnahmen integriert sind. Ausgehend von der letzteren Position haben wir die Stärke des skandinavischen Korporatismus anhand der Involvierung von Interessengruppen in öffentlichen Ausschüssen, Gremien und Kommissionen bewertet. Korporatismus in Verbindung mit der Vorbereitung von Maßnahmen hat in allen drei skandinavischen Ländern abgenommen, während Korporatismus in Implementierungsprozessen in den drei Ländern vielfältiger geworden ist.Resumen El corporativismo puede verse como una variedad del capitalismo en la que determinados requisitos previos estructurales, como la unionización, la centralización y los estados fuertes combinados con la negociación y la concertación, producen determinados resultados económicos. El corporativismo también puede verse como una variedad de democracia, en la cual se integran grupos de interés para la preparación o la aplicación de políticas públicas. Partiendo de la última postura, evaluamos la fuer...

Denmark, Norway and Sweden are still among the most corporatist democracies in the world. Although corporatism has declined in Scandinavia over the last decades, it still exists, albeit at a lower level. Based on comparative and longitudinal data, we argue that this is a consequence of the disruption of some of the prerequisites to corporatist exchange. Neither governments nor the relevant interest groups in Scandinavia control what their exchange partner desires to the same extent as they did during the heyday of corporatism. Despite the involvement of different factors in the three countries, the main pattern is the same. Consequently, the character of state–interest group relations in Scandinavia is not as distinctive as it used to be.

The political context of civil society in Western Europe has changed dramatically in recent decades. These changing circumstances may produce a decline in the integration of civil society into political life – especially deliberative activities at the national level. This article discusses how serious these alleged threats are to a hitherto vital civil society – that of Sweden. It focuses on fours indicators of organised civil society's contribution to deliberative democracy. First, have efforts to contact politicians, public servants and the media, as well as participation in public debates, decreased? Second, has civil society directed interest away from national arenas and instead concentrated resources in local and/or supranational arenas? Third, is there any evidence of a withdrawal from public activities, such as public debates and media activities in favour of direct contacts with politicians and public servants? Fourth, has civil society become more professionalised in the sense that interest groups are increasingly hiring professional consultants? Two surveys conducted in 1999 and 2005 show that Swedish organised civil society has not faded from national public politics. However, growing public participation is almost exclusively connected to increasing communication via the mass media and direct contact with politicians. Taking part in open public debate has not increased. The national arena has marginally lost some importance. Moreover, there is an increasing tendency to hire professional lobbying consultants. This might improve the quality of civil society's contributions to public deliberation, but a more elitist civil society might also develop, which is uninterested in social dialogue.

This article focuses on how institutions matter in generating relationships of trust in an environment of unequal power. Trust is seen as the truster's expectation that the trustee will act trustworthily out of moral commitment and/or interest in continuing the relationship. Using cross-sectional data from a survey conducted in 2006 on Swedish employment relations the authors show that perceived power asymmetries between an employee and his or her superior have a negative impact on trust. However, perceptions about the enforcement and fairness of institutional constraints — rules for dismissal, conflict resolution, wage setting, and promotion — have conditioning effects. When the respondents perceive the rules as fair, trust is less influenced by increasing power asymmetries between an employee and his or her superior. The results have important implications. By designing institutions that are considered fair, distrust may be mitigated even in situations characterized by extensive power asymmetries.

Diversity has powerful advantages, but may also generate internal tensions and low interpersonal trust. Despite extensive attention to these questions, the relationship between diversity and trust is often misunderstood and findings methodologically flawed. In this article, we specify two different mechanisms and adherent hypotheses. An individual might base her decision to trust on her perceived social similarity in relation to others in the community, that is, a similarity hypothesis. However, in a homogenous context, she might expect trustworthy behavior irrespective of her own social position due to signals of low degrees of social conflict and dense social networks, that is, a homogeneity hypothesis. Prior research has pinpointed only one of these mechanisms. The homogeneity hypothesis has not been explicated, and when the intention has been to test the similarity hypothesis, the homogeneity hypothesis has unintentionally been tested instead. The results are straightforward. While the homogeneity hypothesis is strongly supported, the findings speak against the similarity hypothesis.

Central actors in coordinated economies have a dense network of associations for coordinating their actions. However, we lack knowledge of how such relationships are constituted and how the mechanisms of such coordination work. In the present article, we concentrate on the non-market mechanisms of power and trust. We want to know: Are all actors in the industrial relations system connected to each other or are they divided into contending but coherent groups? And in that case, do certain actors playing the role of 'brokers' connect these groups? A social network analysis on survey data from Sweden shows that the state and the peak-organisations still hold powerful positions. Simultaneously, when concentrating on reciprocal ties, the organisational borders are in particular bridged over by public sector organisations. However, actors with power are not highly trusted. Instead, other state actors -especially the Labour Court -play an important role as a broker that all parties trust.

Although power and trust are crucial to human cooperation, and considerable attention has been paid to both these concepts in the social sciences, the relationship between them has been poorly investigated. In this article, based on data about a complete network of labour market actors in Sweden, it is investigated whether power ‘drives out trust’ or if power is a requirement of trust. In contrast to previous research, the article concludes that there is a positive relationship between power and trust, although it levels out when power is at a very high level. Also in disagreement with previous findings, it is shown that symmetry in power relations is not a guarantee of trust: two actors with symmetric low power do not trust each other, at least not in this specific institutional setting. Moreover, the theoretical argument is developed and refined by showing that shared beliefs and group membership also have an independent impact on trust, as well as a perception that the other actor is pursuing the common good. Hence, the presumed negative impact of power on trust is not only neutralised, but also transformed into a positive impact in the social context investigated here. However, more research is needed to show whether this finding is true only within certain institutional settings and, if so, within which ones.

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