Disrupted Exchange and Declining Corporatism: Government Authority and Interest Group Capability in Scandinavia

Abstract

Denmark, Norway and Sweden are still among the most corporatist democracies in the world. Although corporatism has declined in Scandinavia over the last decades, it still exists, albeit at a lower level. Based on comparative and longitudinal data, we argue that this is a consequence of the disruption of some of the prerequisites to corporatist exchange. Neither governments nor the relevant interest groups in Scandinavia control what their exchange partner desires to the same extent as they did during the heyday of corporatism. Despite the involvement of different factors in the three countries, the main pattern is the same. Consequently, the character of state–interest group relations in Scandinavia is not as distinctive as it used to be.

Customizing strategy: Policy goals and interest group strategies

“…Whereas bargaining involves the exchange of resources and information, arguing focuses on political ideas and arguments and seeking to induce change in the beliefs or preferences of other actors (Beyers, 2008(Beyers, , p. 1194. The bargaining mode is consistent with the widespread occurrence of close interaction between groups and civil servants described in many countries (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992;Ö berg et al, 2011), whereas the arguing mode is more akin to the classic pluralist portrayal of pressure groups as external actors seeking influence through lobbying tactics (Truman, 1951).…”

“…Technical insight is thus seen as one of the main resources interest groups offer in exchange for influence in administrative decision-making processes. In fact, interest groups may have more expertise on specific policies than civil servants and are therefore valued for the information they can provide (Johansen and Kristensen, 1982, p. 202;Browne, 1991;Ö berg et al, 2011). On the other hand, when groups work for a policy goal of a more simple nature -something that may be expressed as a one-liner -they are more likely to approach politicians and the media as well as engage in a protest strategy.…”

Who’s in and who’s out?: Explaining access to policymakers in Belgium

“…This is somewhat remarkable, considering that neo-corporatist patterns are in decline in several countries (Traxler, 2010;Oberg et al, 2011), and taking into account the relatively young nature of the system of SACs at the Flemish level, which was established in 2003 (Fobé et al, 2013). Yet, it cannot be concluded that policymakers are insensitive to the representative features of organized interests, as groups with stronger societal roots (especially in terms of membership) stand a better chance of becoming insiders.…”

From classic to modern corporatism. Interest group representation in Danish public committees in 1975 and 2010

“…Most scholars focus on decline in corporatist structures as a corollary of broad societal changes, e.g., the fading patterns of class politics, changing political agendas and the media's increasing political importance (Blom-Hansen 2001;Crepaz 1994;Öberg et al 2011;Schmitter 2008), and argue that corporatist arrangements are of less value for officials and interest groups than in the 1970s and 1980s. However, we posit that central corporatist institutions have in fact survived the potentially undermining effects of societal changes.…”