A key issue for interest groups and policymakers is the ways through which organized interests voice their interests and influence public policy. This article combines two perspectives on interest group representation to explain patterns of interest group access to different political arenas. From a resource exchange perspective, it argues that access to different political arenas is discrete as it is determined by the match between the supply and demands of interest groups and gatekeepers—politicians, bureaucrats, and reporters. From a partly competing perspective, it is argued that access is cumulative and converges around wealthy and professionalized groups. Based on a large‐scale investigation of group presence in Danish political arenas, the analyses show a pattern of privileged pluralism. This describes a system where multiple political arenas provide opportunities for multiple interests but where unequally distributed resources produce cumulative effects (i.e., the same groups have high levels of arena access).

The literature often contrasts interest groups possessing insider status and outsider groups forced to seek influence through more indirect means. Drawing on data from a survey of all national Danish interest groups, this article demonstrates that most groups have an action repertoire including both direct contacts to bureaucrats and parliamentarians and indirect activities such as media campaigns and mobilizations of members. Different strategies of influence are correlated positively, hence, there is no contradiction between pursuing strategies associated with insider access to decision‐making and strategies where pressure is put on decision makers through media contacts and mobilizations. An analysis of four distinct strategies – an administrative, a parliamentary, a media and a mobilization strategy – finds interesting variations in the factors that affect the pursuance of the various strategies of influence. Groups with a privileged position vis‐à‐vis decision makers have high levels of activities targeting these decision makers, but the lack of a privileged position does not lead groups to pursue indirect strategies. Indirect strategies are most intensively pursued by cause groups and groups who find themselves in a competitive situation with regard to attracting members.

The article compares the political activities of different types of interest groups. Drawing on data from a survey of all Danish national interest groups, it demonstrates significant variation in the strategic choices of different types of groups. Groups with corporative resources direct much attention towards influencing the bureaucracy. They possess resources valued by officials and therefore have good options for utilizing a strategy targeting the administration and seeking corporatist integration. By contrast, public interest groups are more likely to use publicly visible strategies in which affecting the media agenda plays a central role. By engaging in such strategies, public interest groups can demonstrate a high level of engagement to their diffuse membership. Furthermore, the goals of public interest groups are typically conducive to pursuit through public strategies. A third category of other groups is incorporated in the analyses as a point of reference to establish patterns of strategy use. While there are clear differences between groups with regard to most strategies of influence, different types of groups are equally engaged in a parliamentary strategy. Interacting with Parliament seems to be important for groups integrated in corporatist structures as well as for those relying more on public strategies.

A prominent presence in the news media is important for interest groups. This article investigates the development in the diversity of interest group media attention over time. The analysis draws on a dataset of 19,000 group appearances in the Danish news media in the period 1984–2003. It demonstrates how diversity has risen continually over time, leading to a media agenda less dominated by labour and business and more by public interest groups and sectional groups. This development is related to the increasing political importance of the news media and the decline in group integration in public decision‐making processes. The article also shows how the development of group appearances is closely related to changes in media attention towards different policy areas.

This paper provides the first systematic cross-country analysis of interest group appearances in the news media. The analysis included three countries -the UK, Spain and Denmark -each representing one of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) three overall models of media and politics: the liberal system, the polarized pluralist system and the democratic corporatist system. We find important similarities across countries with high levels of concentration in media coverage of groups, more extensive coverage of economic groups than citizen groups and differential patterns of group appearances across policy areas and between right-leaning and left-leaning papers. However, we also identify country variation, with the highest degree of concentration among group appearances in Spanish newspapers and most attention to economic groups in Danish newspapers.3

Executive Summary Interest groups pursue a wide range of policy goals. In their attempts to realize these goals, groups may lobby bureaucrats and politicians, approach the media and engage in protest activities. This article investigates the relation between the characteristics of policy goals and the strategies of influence utilized by interest groups. Policy goals are captured by four dimensions emphasizing: (i) the divisibility of goals, (ii) the degree of change sought, (iii) the type of interests pursued, and (iv) how technical goals are. The relevance of these dimensions and the effect of goals on influence strategies are tested in a survey of national Danish interest groups. The findings support the importance of group goals as determining strategy. Groups pursuing general interests mainly lobby parliament and the media, whereas groups with technically complicated goals lobby bureaucrats more intensively. The more divisible a goal a group is pursuing, the more actively it engages in all types of influence strategies.

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